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ABSTRACT                       
 The Korean Diaspora in Japan is a legacy of Japan’s colonization of Korea in the 
first half of the 20th century and has always been the largest group of foreign residents in 
an otherwise ethnically homogenous Japan.  A major issue is the role that Koreans in 
Japan play in supporting North Korea.  Although a very small segment of the population, 
Koreans affiliated with the organization known as Chosen Soren have figured 
prominently in the triangular relationship between Japan, North Korea, and South Korea 
over the past 50 years.   
 During the Cold War, Chosen Soren activities in support of North Korea severely 
strained Japan-South Korea relations that were already plagued by lingering animosity 
from the colonial period.  For many years, Chosen Soren was the conduit through which 
Japan and North Korea attempted to expand trade and eventually establish formal 
diplomatic ties.  However, Japan-North Korea relations have deteriorated in the post-
Cold War era due to North Korea’s growing military threat to Japan, and most recently, 
North Korea’s admission that it had been systematically kidnapping Japanese citizens.   
Studying the history of Chosen Soren will result in a better understanding of the 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
Many think that Japan is an ethnically homogenous country, and, for the most 
part, it is.  Officially, the Government of Japan in Tokyo does not identify any minority 
groups among its population of 127 million.  Instead, Japanese government statistics 
classify 1.85 million people as registered foreign residents of Japan.1   Although most of 
these people are permanent residents, few will complete Japan’s arduous and complicated 
naturalization process.  Thus, American sources such as the U.S. State Department and 
the CIA World Factbook identify these 1.85 million people, a little less than percent of 
the population, as an ethnic group within Japan.2  With an estimated population of 
625,000, Koreans are by far the largest number of foreign residents in Japan.3  At first 
glance, Japan’s Korean “minority” does not seem very significant.   Yet, for over half a 
century, ethnic Koreans in Japan greatly influenced Tokyo’s foreign policy toward both 
of the rival governments on the Korean Peninsula.  
Large numbers of Koreans came to Japan when Korea was a Japanese colony 
from 1910-1945.  After its defeat in World War II, Japan was stripped of its colonial 
possessions.  Since many were in Japan against their will, the Japanese and their 
American conquerors assumed that Koreans would return to their liberated homeland.   
But over 600,000 Koreans, most of who came to Japan voluntarily, remained in Japan, 
and they and their descendents comprise the majority of today’s Korean community in 
Japan.  The Japanese term for ethnic Koreans living in Japan is zainichi Kankokujin.   
                                                 
1 Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, 
Japan Statistical Yearbook 2004, <www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/zuhyou/y0214000.xls>, 28 
November 2003. 
2 U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, <www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm 
and CIA World Factbook, <www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ja.html#People>, 28 November 
2003. 
3 Japan Statistical Yearbook 2004. 
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Kankokujin means “Korean person,” but zainichi implies “temporary resident in Japan,” 
hardly the case for a people that have been living in the country now for three or four 
generations.4    
My research focused on the zainichi Koreans involved with the organization 
known as Chosen Soren (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), which is 
affiliated with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea.5    
Chosen Soren was established after World War II as an organization of “overseas citizens 
of the DPRK” that vowed to stay out of Japanese domestic politics to concentrate its 
energy on the unification of Korea under then-leader Kim Il Sung.  Japan’s alliance with 
the United States against the DPRK’s alliance with the Soviet Union made Chosen 
Soren’s presence in Japan awkward enough.  Complicating the situation was the 
existence of Mindan (The Korean Resident’s Union in Japan), most of whom are citizens 
of the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea.6   Although not formal allies, the ROK 
and Japan are connected strategically by their separate alliances with the United States.  
Nonetheless, South Korea’s relations with Japan, a “friend,” have been almost as rocky as 
its relations with its rival to the north.  This paper examines Chosen Soren’s close 
association with the DPRK and its effect on Japan’s relations with North and South 
Korea.  
B. PURPOSE 
 I first approached this topic from a security standpoint.  My research initially 
centered on the question:  Are the Japanese government and United States Forces Japan 
(USFJ) concerned about the threat posed by a group of people, perhaps numbering 
100,000, who actively support the DPRK’s belligerent and enigmatic government in 
Pyongyang?   
                                                 
4 Fukuoka Yasunori, “Beyond Assimilation: Diverse Resolutions to Identity Crises Among Younger 
Generation Koreans in Japan.,” <www.han.org/a/fukuoka96b.html>, 5 December 2002. 
5 Chosen Soren is also known by its Korean language name, Chosun Chongryun, more commonly 
referred to in its abbreviated form, Chongryun.  Japanese language sources refer to the organization as 
Chosen Soren while its members and other Koreans call it Chongryun.  Since I did not determine a pattern 
in English language sources I researched and I am writing this paper from the Japanese perspective, I will 
use the term Chosen Soren.  However, the reader will notice Chongryun used in direct quotations. 
6 Mindan is both the Korean and Japanese name for this organization because Koreans and Japanese 
pronounce the ideographs for this word the same way. 
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 Japan’s indigenous “Korean threat” has its roots in the Korean independence 
movement during the colonial era that had its headquarters in Shanghai, China, and was 
linked to the Kuomintang government in the Republic of China.   Following World War 
II, Korean involvement in the black market, the 1948 Osaka school riots, and acts of 
sabotage to protest the Korean War underscored fears that Koreans were a destabilizing 
element of Japanese society.  During the Cold War, Chosen Soren was suspected of 
recruiting and training North Korean agents, spying against South Korea, plotting 
assassinations, and kidnapping.  Since the DPRK emerged as a potential nuclear threat 
ten years ago, Chosen Soren’s illegal endeavors have included embezzling money and 
transferring dual-use technology to North Korea, not to mention the billions of dollars it 
has legally provided to help Pyongyang develop its nuclear program, create Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD), and build missiles.7   
 Armed with this knowledge, the reader’s next questions are probably:  If the 
activities of Chosen Soren have been so well-documented, how has it managed to survive 
and why has Japan permitted it to operate for nearly half a century?   
 This thesis attempts answer the aforementioned questions by demonstrating that 
Chosen Soren has had a significant impact on Japan’s relations with its Korean neighbors 
over the past 50 years.  During the Cold War, Tokyo’s reluctance or inability to crack 
down on Chosen Soren was a frequent source of friction with the ROK government in 
Seoul.  In the current post-Cold War era, Tokyo bemoans Chosen Soren’s role in 
financing the North Korean missiles (perhaps nuclear-tipped) that now menace Japan. By 
studying the history of Chosen Soren, the reader will better understand the complexities 
underlying Japan’s foreign policy toward the DPRK.   
C. ORGANIZATION 
 Chapter II:  “Development of the Korean Community in Japan,” provides the 
historical background for this survey of Chosen Soren.  First, it briefly touches on the 
long running and acrimonious Japan-Korea rivalry, a situation that was only exacerbated 
                                                 
7 Nomura Hataru, excerpts from his book Tokyo Kitachosen Sokin Giwaku, 17 June 1999, in FBIS, 22 
November 2003.  I was fortunate enough to come across this excerpt from Nomura’s book in FBIS.  It 
provides a concise, yet very detailed history of Chosen Soren that parallels what I am trying to do in this 
thesis. 
 4
by Japanese colonial rule over Korea from 1910-1945.  Next, it outlines the mass 
movement of Koreans to Japan and the formation of Japan’s Korean minority, one of the 
most significant developments of the colonial period.  Finally, this chapter discusses the 
division of the Korean community in Japan that reflected the political partition of the 
Korean homeland.   
Chapter III: “Chosen Soren in the Cold War,” illustrates how Chosen Soren 
figured prominently in the triangular relationship between Japan and the rival 
governments on the Korean peninsula during the Cold War.  Chosen Soren activities and 
Japan’s inability or reluctance to control the organization were a serious strain on Japan-
ROK relations, already burdened by baggage from the colonial period.  Seoul was also 
irritated by Japan’s attempted use of Chosen Soren to expand economic ties and improve 
relations with the DPRK.  As the cold War progressed, Chosen Soren solidarity began 
wavering as South Korean successes and North Korea’s deficiencies became better 
known.   
Chapter IV: “The Fall of Chosen Soren,” details Chosen Soren’s decline over the 
past ten years as both Koreans and Japanese have become increasingly disillusioned with 
the DPRK.  Pyongyang’s emergence as a nuclear threat and Japan’s decade-long 
recession prompted many to closely scrutinize and eventually restrict Chosen Soren’s 
economic contributions to North Korea.  South Korea’s emergence as an international 
economic power and democracy, Pyongyang’s frequent provocations, and generational 
change continued to weaken Chosen Soren’s membership base.  Finally, the Japanese 
public’s outrage following North Korea’s admission that it kidnapped Japanese citizens 
resulted in swift legal actions that have severely hampered the ability of Chosen Soren to 
effectively function.     
Chapter V: “Conclusion,” summarizes the findings of this research.  First, the 
conclusion addresses why the organization has existed, against all odds, for such a long 
period of time.  Then, the chapter assesses Chosen Soren’s current status.  Ultimately, the 
objective of this thesis is to shed light on the historical issues that factor into Japan’s 




II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE KOREAN COMMUNITY IN JAPAN  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
Early Korea-Japan relations are best described as a teacher-student relationship, 
with Korea representing the teacher.  Because it was closer to the “Middle Kingdom,” 
Korea ranked higher than Japan in China’s hierarchical world system.   Before Korea 
became a unified nation-state, its separate kingdoms received the unadulterated benefits 
of Chinese civilization directly before imparting it across the sea to Japan.  The Korean 
peninsula was a major bridge across which the more ancient and advanced culture of 
continental Asia was transmitted to Japan:  Buddhism from India (via central Asia and 
China) and Confucianism, the writing system, the calendar and artistic heritage of China 
arrived via this route.  Indeed, some scholars will argue that, even today, Koreans are 
obsessed with the fact that Korea was originally Japan’s teacher.8   
By the third century C.E., Korea had a strong influence over Japan. Japan’s Yayoi 
peoples built burial mounds that were identical to those found in the Silla Kingdom of 
Korea.  The Three Imperial Regalia, still symbols of imperial authority in modern Japan, 
also came from Silla.9   
Perhaps the most prominent feature of Korea’s early sophistication was its close 
copy of China’s unified kingdom and structured civil society based on Confucianism.  
Japan’s early history resembles that of Korea.  Both nations shared the same cultural 
roots, but the Japanese eventually developed strikingly different social and political 
structures.  Japan’s island-based separation from the mainland allowed the Japanese to 
alter and shape cultural imports with distinctive Japanese characteristics.10     
Korea’s role as a victim began when Japanese pirates began raiding the coast in 
the thirteenth century and peaked with Hideyoshi Toyotomi’s invasions in 1592 and 
1597.  The evidence of Hideyoshi’s brutality is still on display today in Kyoto, Japan at 
                                                 
8 Paul Huen Chan, “From Colony to Neighbor:  Relations Between Japan and South Korea, 1945-
1985,” Ph.D. dissertation., Johns Hopkins University, 1988, pp. 40-41.  
9 John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia:  Transition and 
Transformation, Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 1989, pp. 329-330. 
10 Ibid., p. 324. 
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the mimizuka (ear mound), where the ears and noses of tens of thousands of Koreans slain 
by Hideyoshi’s forces are buried.11  The Japanese incursions devastated Korea.  Cultural 
treasures and monuments were destroyed, agriculture declined, and Korea’s ruling Yi 
dynasty was weakened to such a degree that it never fully recovered.12    
By the middle of the 19th century, it was clear that more powerful and 
technologically advanced Europeans were intent on dominating Asia.  The stability and 
structure of Confucian civilization, which facilitated the great achievements of ancient 
China, became its Achilles heel.  Neither the Ming dynasty in China nor the Yi dynasty in 
Korea were able to adapt to the changing conditions.  As a result, China would suffer the 
great humiliation of being dominated and divided into zones of influence by European 
powers.   
Japan soon realized that Korea faced a fate similar to that of China.  German 
General Klemens Wilhelm Meckel, who was very influential in developing the Imperial 
Japanese Army, commented that Korea’s geopolitical position was a “dagger pointed at 
the heart of Japan.”13  Indeed, the Mongols used Korea as a staging area in two 
unsuccessful attacks on Japan in the late 13th century.  Control of Korea was seen as 
essential to Japan’s security.   
Fortunately for Japan, it was as successful in adapting to the ways of the 
European imperialists in the late 19th century as the Koreans were centuries earlier in 
copying Confucian China.  After the United States forced Japan to open its economy to 
U.S. trade in 1853, the Japanese proved to be quick studies by using “coercive 
diplomacy” to secure economic concessions from Korea in 1876.  Japanese encroachment 
into China’s traditional sphere of influence eventually led to the Sino-Japanese War in 
1894-1895.  Japan’s victory removed the Chinese from Korea, but Russia soon entered 
the equation.  After several more years of wrestling for control of “the dagger,” Japan and 
Russia fought a war to settle the question of suzerainty over the peninsula once and for 
                                                 
11 Michael H. Armacost and Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan and the Unification of Korea:  Challenges for 
U.S. Policy Coordination, NBR Analysis, Vol. 10. No. 1, (March 1999), pp. 9-10.   
12 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, East Asia:  Transition and Transformation, p. 316. 
13 Meirion and Susie Harries, Soldiers of the Sun:  The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army 
(New York:  Random House, 1992), p. 53. 
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all.  After its unexpected victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan made Korea a 
protectorate in 1905 and formally annexed it in 1910. 
B. THE COLONIAL PERIOD, 1910-1945 
The emotional and psychological hangover of the colonial period still adversely 
affects Japan-Korean relations today, as lingering feelings of resentment reside on both 
sides of the sea separating the two nations.14  These feelings are shared by Koreans in 
both South and North Korea.  Koreans synthesized a modern national identity based on 
anti-Japanese feelings, while the Japanese developed ambivalent, but culturally and even 
racially superior, attitudes toward their former colonial subjects.15   
Koreans view Japan’s colonization of Korea as an immoral “cultural” 
aggression.16   Colonial regulations designed to fully assimilate second-class Korean 
citizens into the Japanese Empire forced Koreans to adopt Japanese names, speak 
Japanese, and worship at Shinto shrines.17   Japanese attempts to eliminate exceptions to 
the homogeneity of the nation were best exemplified by eliminating all forms of ethnic 
identification, including names.  On February 11, 1940, the 2600th anniversary of the 
legendary founding of the Japanese imperial line, a program was implemented to impose 
Japanese names on all Koreans.  Nearly 76 percent of the population adopted Japanese 
names by mid-1940, but the process was halted when members of the former Korean 
royal family, which had been co-opted into the Japanese peerage, persuaded the Japanese 
court to allow them to retain their Yi (Lee) surname.18 
Koreans remember Japanese rule as ruthless and exploitative.19  In addition to 
using Korea as a buffer against foreign encroachment, Japan diverted Korean natural 
resources, rice crops, and most importantly, Korean people, to power its war machine.  
                                                 
14 Even this is a source of contention between Japan and Korea.  Korea recognizes the body of water 
separating it from Japan as the East Sea (Dong Hae).  In future references to this body of water, I will 
follow the   international practice—at least for now—of calling it the Sea of Japan (Nihon Kai). 
15Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism:  The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, 
(Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 10. 
16 Paul Huen Chan, p. 59. 
17 Armacost and Pyle, p. 13. 
18 George Hicks, Japan’s Hidden Apartheid: The Korean Minority and the Japanese, (Brookfield:  
Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997), p. 17. 
19 Paul Huen Chan, p. 54. 
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Cheap—or in some cases, free— Korean labor played a large role in Japan’s pre-war 
military and industrial buildup.  At the end of the war, over 2.3 million Koreans—
roughly 10 percent of Korea’s population—were living in Japan.20  It is estimated that 
over 200,000 Korean women were forced to work as prostitutes for Japanese soldiers, 
and 22,000 out of a total of 240,000 Korean men died as conscripts in the Imperial 
Japanese Army.21  
The colonial experience also resulted in a negative Japanese view of Koreans.   
First, there was Japanese racial chauvinism or pride.  Japan was proud of the fact that it 
had adapted to Western standards and become an empire builder itself.  Consequently, 
the Japanese looked down upon other Asians who were not advanced enough to save 
themselves like the Japanese had.  The Hermit Kingdom of Chosen was a perfect 
example of this.  In contrast to Korean bitterness at being colonized and exploited, the 
prevailing Japanese view is that Japan contributed to Korean modernization.22   
Secondly, the immigrants who came to Japan from Korea did not exactly make a 
good impression on the haughty Japanese either.  Poor economic conditions in Korea, 
exacerbated by Japanese intervention, led to significant immigration into Japan through 
World War II.  Koreans who came to Japan were mostly poor, uneducated farmers or 
unskilled laborers from less industrialized areas in southern Korea.  As a result, the 
Korean population in Japan was characterized by illiteracy, poverty, and a high crime 
rate.23  To the Japanese, Koreans who came to Japan exemplified the backwardness of 
the country.  Feelings of enmity on both sides would poison Korean-Japanese relations 
after World War II.   
1. Early Immigration 
The Japanese incorporation of Korea in 1905 was one of the first fateful steps that 
led to the death and destruction of World War II.  Japan colonized Korea partly out of 
                                                 
20 “The People’s Korea” <http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/003rd_issue/chongryun/PartII0102.htm>, 29 
November 2002. 
21 David Suzuki and Keibo Oiwa, “The Korean Mirror” in The Japan We Never Knew:  A Journal of 
Discovery, (Toronto:  Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, 1996), p. 167. 
22 Paul Huen Chan, p. 54. 
23 Alice K. Lee, “Koreans in Japan: Their Influence on Korean-Japanese Relations,” Master’s Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 1979, p. 11. 
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fear that it would become dominated by a country hostile to Japan and also because Japan 
needed to expand its markets for its burgeoning economy.  The changes introduced by 
Japan were intended to modernize Korea, but social effects were destabilizing and, in 
some cases, disastrous.   
Poor economic conditions in Korea, partially caused by Japanese intervention, led 
to the dramatic growth in the numbers of Koreans in Japan in the first two decades of the 
20th century.  In 1885, records show that there was one Korean living in Japan.24  On the 
eve of the absorption of Korea in 1909, only 790 Koreans lived in Japan, but by 1918, the 
Korean population in Japan had grown to 22,262.25   
Before the annexation, all land in Korea belonged to the sovereign, but farmers 
were given cultivation rights if they paid taxes.  From 1910-1918, the Japanese attempted 
to modernize and commercialize Korea’s economy by carrying out an extensive land 
survey to clarify property ownership and consolidate large land holdings.  Many illiterate 
farmers lost title to their land by failing to register properly.  The yangban (local gentry) 
also took advantage of the situation, sometimes claiming public lands and even private 
lands.  The increased use of money and a new tax structure also cast many farmers into 
debt.26   
The population of Korea increased by 30 percent between 1915 and 1930, but 
jobs were not created to keep up with population growth.  The increased population and 
development of a large landless class imposed great hardships on Koreans.  A 1925 
Japanese report listed bad economic conditions in Korea due to poor weather and poor 
crops, hope for higher pay in Japan, and encouragement from countrymen returning form 
Japan as the primary reasons causing immigration.27  The majority of Koreans who went 
to Japan had been tenant farmers or unskilled laborers from Pusan or other areas in 
southern Korea.28 
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2. Between the Great Wars, 1918-1931 
Koreans who came to Japan lived in squalid ghettos and worked in dirty, 
dangerous, difficult (kitanai, kiken, kitsui or “3k” in Japanese) jobs and factories, doing 
things most Japanese would never consider.  Most Koreans intended to stay only long 
enough to make some money before returning home.   The condition of Koreans in Japan 
before World War II foreshadowed their plight later as they often lived in segregated 
ghettos and were under strict government control due to constant Japanese fear of their 
involvement in independence and labor movements.29  As laborers alienated from 
mainstream Japanese society, many Koreans were attracted to leftist ideologies.30  
Due to its lowly and weak position in Japanese society, the Korean population 
experienced much hardship and discrimination, sometimes taken to despicable extremes.  
After the Kanto Earthquake devastated Tokyo on September 1, 1923, Japanese citizens 
added to the tragedy by slaughtering 6000 Koreans after rumors spread that Koreans were 
poisoning the water.31   
The Japanese economy rapidly expanded during World War I and eagerly 
absorbed cheap Korean labor.  Korean immigrants rose from 3,630 in 1914 to 419,000 in 
1930.32  But the economy was depressed after 1920, through the Stock Market Crash of 
1929 and up until the Manchurian incident in 1931.  Even in these depressed conditions, 
Korean labor kept pouring into Japan. 
The influx of Korean labor did not create Japan’s labor problem; it only 
aggravated it.  Korean students, Korean laborers, and nationalists eventually became 
drawn to radical left-wing politics.  Through the 1920s and 1930s, the Japanese 
government experienced a hysterical red scare, which led to the promulgation of the 
Peace Preservation Law in May 1925.  Massive national roundups on March 15, 1928 
and April 16, 1929 led to the arrests of 2500 people.  These campaigns essentially forced 
the Japanese Communist Party (founded in 1922) underground.  As a result of the 
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crackdown, the Japanese and Korean communist parties agreed to join forces.  As 
communists and Korean nationalists both felt strongly about opposing imperialism and 
abandoning Japan’s overseas colonies, they made logical political allies.33  
In September 1931, the Japanese military staged a bombing of the South 
Manchurian Railway near Mukden, giving Japan a pretext to expand its empire to 
southern Manchuria.  After “the Manchurian Incident,” Korean nationalists renewed their 
efforts to rebel, primarily by assassinating high Japanese officials.  A Korean laborer 
named Yi Pong Chang (Asayama Shoichi in Japanese) attempted to assassinate the 
Emperor on January 9, 1932, an event known as the Sakuradamon Incident, after the 
place it occurred.  The backlash against Korean leftists was particularly ferocious, 
especially since the Korean communists were very active in the period.  In 1933, 1820 
Koreans were arrested for violations of the Peace Preservation Law, a thousand more 
than were arrested in any other year through the end of the Second World War.34 
Those who came to Japan in the 1920s were mostly unmarried men who planned 
to stay long enough to make money and return home.  After 1931, Japanese industry 
began to recover and Koreans found greater economic opportunities.  The Japanese 
government encouraged married couples to emigrate to stabilize the Korean minority.  In 
1925, Korean males outnumbered females seven to one, but by 1939, that ratio had been 
reduced to one and a half to one and 88 percent of Koreans were living in family units.  
After 1939, these trends toward permanence in housing and jobs declined with the influx 
of labor brought in to power the Japanese war machine.35     
Just before the Manchurian Incident, there were 3 million Japanese unemployed.  
The Manchurian Incident and resulting military operations in China stimulated the 
Japanese economy.  From 1933 to 1936 the yearly increase in the demand for labor was 
double the number of new workers available.36 
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3. Japan at War, 1931-1945 
The Korean population in Japan increased sharply as a result of the war.   When 
Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, there were 312,212 Koreans in Japan.  An estimated 
70,000-80,000 Koreans were forcibly brought to Japan every year from 1932 to 1937 as 
the China conflict escalated.  By the time the United States entered the war in 1941, the 
population of Koreans in Japan jumped to 1,469,320, topping out at 2,365,263 people at 
the time of Japan’s surrender.37   
The Labor Mobilization Law was promulgated in August 1939.  Ironically, the 
Japanese mainland had difficulty filling its labor quotas due to competition with the 
governor–general of Korea, who diverted a fair share of southern Korea’s surplus labor 
up to industrial northern Korea.38  Koreans performed manual, backbreaking labor under 
the most brutal and austere conditions.  A prominent historian of Japan revealed his 
shock and horror when he first learned of Korean labor gangs: “Beneath the key 
installations that have sustained Japan’s post-war development—its mines, coal fields, 
dams, harbors and airports—are buried the corpses of countless Koreans, all unknown!”39  
According to North Korean figures, which are dubious at best, one million Koreans were 
conscripted to construct military bases and work in collieries during the war, and 60,000 
Koreans died in collieries from 1940-1945.40   
However, Mitchell argues that Korean labor was overworked to the same degree 
as their Japanese counterparts during the war.  The Japanese were also conscripted, so the 
term “slave labor” is not accurate in this case.  He cites the frequent labor arbitration and 
the fact that many did return to Korea upon completion of their contracts to support his 
position.  Until bombing of Japanese cities became commonplace, many Koreans were 
willing to come to Japan voluntarily in search of higher salaries and better 
opportunities.41   
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Like the tragedy after the Kanto Earthquake, the Japanese masses found the 
Korean population an easy scapegoat upon which to take out their frustrations as their 
cities were bombed into oblivion.  A substantial number of Koreans were among the 
victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings as well.42 
C. KOREANS IN JAPAN DURING THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION  
During U.S. occupation of postwar Japan, a distinct pattern of treatment of 
Koreans was established.  The first great disadvantage that Koreans experienced was that 
the United States did not know what to do with them.  American planners thought 
Koreans would return to their liberated homeland.  All but 600,000 did, but this was still 
a substantial number, especially since they were concentrated in urban-industrial areas, or 
the bombed-out remains of them.   
Next, the old prejudices against Koreans returned.  Bitter Japanese blamed 
Koreans for losing the war and were angered by celebrating Koreans who rejoiced in 
their independence. Competition for resources during this period was fierce.  Koreans, 
already on the margins of society, were completely shut out of it.  The tight-knit Korean 
communities survived by dealing on the black market.  
As the Pacific War quickly transformed into the Cold War, the original intent of 
the occupation, punishing and restructuring Japan, soon shifted into transforming Japan 
into a “bulwark against communism.”  U.S. occupation forces ruled through Japanese 
bureaucrats and left domestic policy that did not affect security and stability to the 
Japanese.  Thus, de facto and de jure discrimination against Koreans continued.   
1. The Unforeseen Problem 
The office of the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP), despite its 
name, was a U.S. organization led by General Douglas MacArthur that oversaw the 
occupation of defeated Japan.  The United States was aware of the Korean minority issue 
in Japan, but no one had devised a plan to deal with Koreans in Japan, thinking that 
Koreans would solve the problem themselves by simply returning to Korea.  Indeed, from 
the day Japan announced its surrender on August 15, 1945, to November 30, 1945, 
800,000 of the nearly 2.4 million Koreans in Japan returned home.  But American 
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military authorities feared the spread of disease and the Japanese black market would 
occur if it continued to allow the unregulated movement of Koreans across the Tsushima 
Straits.  On November 1, 1945, a SCAP directive limiting individuals to 1000 yen and 
250 pounds of property when leaving Japan stemmed the flow of Korean repatriates.43  
Still, an additional 590,000 people returned to Korea under SCAP guidelines through 
August 1947.44   
Eventually, over 600,000 Koreans elected to remain in Japan after World War II.   
Koreans who remained in Japan did not return to their homeland for a variety of reasons, 
most due to their loss of economic base in Korea and the post-war turmoil and chaos in 
the region, including the environment that led to the partitioning of the peninsula.45  After 
the war, Korea was in a state of economic collapse, and the south, from where most of the 
Koreans in Japan had come, was ravaged by floods and epidemics.  Some heard that 
Koreans who remained at home resented those who were returning.  Interestingly, two-
thirds of those who remained in Japan after the war had immigrated to Japan before 1930 
and settled there permanently.46  Other Koreans returned to Japan after being confronted 
with the realities of a Korean economy and infrastructure that had been wracked by 35 
years of Japanese exploitation.  Since the United States was trying to establish a 
democratic government in Korea, SCAP prohibited Koreans who had joined the Japanese 
Communist Party from leaving Japan.  Ironically, many of these people were not 
communists, but had used the organization to aid their fight against the Japanese right-
wing imperialists in order to gain Korean independence.47 
2. Legal Status 
Thus, the Korean minority problem created by the Japanese empire continued to 
be troublesome after the war.  Korean-Japanese relations, bad from the beginning, grew 
worse after the war, as Koreans wished to be treated as liberated people, freed from the 
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Japanese imperialists, instead of as the second-class citizens that the Japanese continued 
to label them.  Initially, American occupation leaders and the Japanese government 
agreed that Koreans who had not been repatriated would be under Japanese jurisdiction 
until a peace treaty could decide their status.  Koreans resented this and demanded 
reparations for their treatment during the war.   
Since the United States was more concerned with stability than civil rights, 
solving the Korean minority question was at the bottom of its priority list, if it was even 
considered at all.  Aware that many Korean movements during the colonial era were 
disruptive independence agitators with communist ties, SCAP regarded Koreans in Japan 
as potentially subversive and as obstacles to its reform program.  Consequently, SCAP’s 
view on the Korean minority was similar to that of the imperial Japanese government.48 
The vexing issue of the legal status of Koreans remained unsolved for quite some 
time.  SCAP decreed on November 20, 1946, that Koreans who were not repatriated 
would fall under the jurisdiction of the Japanese and would be treated as Japanese.49  The 
ambivalent U.S. position on Koreans regarded them as “liberated” nationals in situations 
where military security was not involved and “enemy” nationals if the case was a security 
issue, as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur.50 
After the initial shock of defeat wore off and after ascertaining that SCAP had no 
definitive policy on Koreans, the Japanese government began bitterly attacking Koreans, 
accusing them of creating the black market, increasing the crime rate, carrying disease, 
not paying taxes, and other societal offenses.  In November 1946, in Tokyo’s Ueno 
district, police placed anti-Korean posters on walls warning people of robbers by using a 
Korean emblem.51   
SCAP itself contributed to the hysteria by expressing fear of illegal Korean 
immigrants spreading cholera and by not censoring the Japanese media’s anti-Korean 
attacks.  Concerned about illegal immigration of Koreans and the black market, American 
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authorities prompted the Japanese to enact an alien registration order on May 2, 1947.  
Initial Korean protests and resistance were soon muted and in the end many complied.52   
On September 8, 1951, Japan and 48 countries signed the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, officially ending the occupation. The treaty, which was to go into effect on April 
28, 1952, stripped Koreans in Japan of their nationality and placed them in legal limbo, 
noting, “until their status was decided legally they could remain residents in Japan 
without having obtained resident qualification.”53  With SCAP's encouragement, Japan 
and the Republic of Korea began negotiations on the status of Koreans in Japan in 
October 1951, but two years later, negotiators were still deadlocked and talks were 
suspended.54  The issue was not legally decided until the Republic of Korea-Japan 
Normalization Treaty of 1965 granted “permanent resident” status to Koreans who had 
resided in Japan before the end of the war.  This status was not extended to the children 
of these Koreans, however, leaving the situation for later generations to resolve.55 
D. THE DIVISION OF THE KOREAN COMMUNITY  
On October 15, 1945, Koreans in Japan created Chosoren (League of Koreans 
Residing in Japan), a single non-political organization to coordinate interests of the 
Korean community during the transitional phase of political uncertainty and economic 
devastation.56  Chosoren dealt chiefly with repatriation and economic aid for needy 
Koreans and basically served as a quasi-governmental organization in its dealings with 
the Japanese.  In effect, Chosoren took over the duties of the governor-general of Korea, 
with regard to handling disputes between Japanese and Koreans; administering justice to 
Korean criminals; distributing relief supplies obtained from the Welfare Ministry; and 
extracting separation bonuses and back pay from companies that had employed Korean 
laborers.   
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In the chaos immediately following the war, the Japanese government was 
hesitant to act and the occupation forces had yet began to govern.  Chosoren stepped into 
this situation to control the repatriation program by gaining control of ships and 
scheduling trains to bring Koreans to embarkation points.  Even after SCAP took control 
of the process in November 1945, Chosoren was allowed to select the people to fill daily 
quotas for reparation, which gave Chosoren great strength.  SCAP did not outlaw this 
practice until May 1946.57 
Chosoren carried out an extensive welfare program using supplies received from 
the Welfare Ministry.  Chosoren also financed its operations by keeping the bank and 
postal savings books of repatriates and by negotiating directly with the Ministry of 
Finance, securing over 100 million yen during the first four months of 1946.58  As 
Japanese enjoyed preference in employment, Chosoren and many Koreans participated in 
black-market trading and illegal distilling.  This did not sit well with occupation 
authorities against the backdrop of the emerging Cold War, the division of Korea, and 
rebuilding Japan as Asia’s “bulwark against communism.”59 
Even before the end of 1945, factional fissures in the Korean community began to 
develop as the Chosoren became politicized.  Those who were dissatisfied with 
Chosoren’s radical tendencies broke away to form Mindan in conjunction with the 
establishment of Syngman Rhee’s government in South Korea in 1948.  The formal 
division of Korea and the creation of separate governments in the north and south 
solidified the split in Japan’s Korean community along ideological lines.  
1. Divided Country, Divided Countrymen  
In August 1945, the United States and the USSR agreed to divide the Korean 
peninsula at the 38th parallel.  In the north, Soviet-style people’s committees were 
organized.  By the end of 1946, land distribution, equal rights for men and women, 
nationalization of industry, social security, and labor laws were in place.  The south, from 
where most of the Koreans in Japan had immigrated, was ravaged by floods and 
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epidemics.  Also, the basic colonial bureaucratic structure as well as many former 
colonial administrators and Japanese collaborators were retained by U.S. authorities to 
help rebuild the ravished country.  The political situation in the south was chaotic and 
many individuals competed for authority and legitimacy as opposed to the perception that 
famous patriots were efficiently leading the north.  As a result, over 600,000 Koreans 
elected to remain in Japan at the end of World War II.  Both Korean governing systems 
claimed to represent the entire peninsula and thus all Koreans in Japan.60 
The formal division of Korea and the creation of a separate Republic of Korea 
government in the South in 1948 solidified the split in Japan’s Korean community along 
ideological lines.   The Korean organization associated with the North briefly joined 
forces with the Japanese Communist Party in the Minsen (the Democratic Front of 
Koreans) before establishing the formally independent Chosen Soren in May 1955.61 
2. The Osaka School Riots  
By October 1947, Chosoren had established 578 schools and employed 1500 
teachers to educate 62,000 students throughout Japan.  (In contrast, the proto-Mindan 
groups had only established 40 schools and 6,828 pupils.)62  Ethnic Korean education, a 
distinguishing feature of Korean marginalization in Japanese society today, served as an 
early example of the threat Koreans posed to Japanese society.  Ethnic schools were 
originally established to prepare for repatriation.  Koreans soon realized that many would 
remain in Japan, and the schools’ focus shifted to preserving their Korean heritage.   
American occupation authorities prompted the Japanese Education Ministry to 
decree that Korean children must be enrolled in public schools or accredited private 
schools, leading to the Osaka-Kobe Education Incident of April 1948.  Korean protests 
against closings of Chosoren schools turned violent, leading to the only declared state of 
emergency during the Occupation.  One youth was killed, hundreds injured, vast property 
damage occurred, and 4600 arrests were made.  Eventually 169 persons were charged 
with sedition later in the year, and the Chosoren was banned under the Organization 
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Control Law.63  Investigations supported the opinion that the education uprising was 
organized by the Japanese Communist Party.  The education protest was the final event 
that convinced SCAP that Chosoren and its affiliated left-wing Korean organizations 
posed a threat to stability and democracy in Japan.64 
Shortly after the Osaka school riots, Japan underwent its own “red purge” that 
reflected American anxieties over the loss of China.  On September 8, 1949, the Japanese 
government dissolved Chosoren and three other left-wing Korean groups for “anti-
democratic and terroristic associations that resisted the orders of the Allied 
Occupation.”65  The Ministry of Justice dissolved the league and confiscated assets 
valued in excess of 70 million yen.66  In retrospect, hostile policy towards the Korean 
minority was counterproductive.  Persecution of Chosoren only reinforced the feeling of 
separateness and nationalism among Koreans in Japan and pushed them further into the 
orbit of North Korean influence.67   
3. Anti-war Activism 
On April 28, 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect, ending the 
American occupation and restoring Japanese sovereignty.  Koreans and Taiwanese lost 
the Japanese nationality once imposed upon them as colonial subjects.  Now they fell 
under the Alien Registration Law (ARL), which required fingerprinting and the 
possession of a passbook at all times.68  In addition to simple ethnic discrimination, the 
measures of the ARL were enacted because the Japanese government viewed the Korean 
population as a potentially dangerous and subversive element due to fire-bombings of 
police stations and sabotage of factories and U.S. bases by North Korean sympathizers 
early in the Korean War.69   
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The Korean conflict inflamed passions of Koreans in Japan, especially those of 
the left wing.  During the war, the DPRK-affiliated Minsen collaborated with the 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) to sabotage the production of war materials destined for 
Korea and raise funds and spread propaganda for North Korea.  Riots between 
communists and police in industrial areas increased from 1951 to the spring of 1952, 
culminating in the May Day riots on the Imperial Palace Plaza that left one dead and 
thousands injured.70  Kim Shijong, a prominent Korean poet in Japan, explained his 
involvement in the antiwar movement:  “… ninety percent of resident Koreans were 
behind it.  Trains were loaded with bombs.  If they could be stopped for ten minutes, it 
would save 10,000 lives in Korea.  So we’d lie on tracks or break signals so they were 
fixed on stop….  The Japanese government, with help from the CIA, did all they could to 
crush us….”71 
Soon, however, North Korea felt that Minsen’s priorities were misplaced and 
ordered it to end its association with the JCP and concentrate on Korean problems.  
Minsen disbanded on May 26, 1955 and was replaced by the modern-day Chosen Soren.  
This organization was determined to remain independent of other communist 
organizations, concentrate solely on the livelihood of Koreans in Japan, and promote 
DPRK interests.  Its goals were:  peaceful unification of Korea, protection of Korean 
racial rights, the promotion of racial education, and the normalization of relations 
between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Japan.72   
4. Mindan 
The upstart Mindan had much to overcome when it was founded in 1948.  For 
one, most Koreans identified with the Chosoren because of its wealth and the power and 
influence it wielded in the areas of education and repatriation.    Also, the south’s 
fledgling government was too concerned with establishing its own stability and largely 
neglected Koreans in Japan.  Like Chosoren, Mindan was dedicated to promoting the 
welfare of Koreans in Japan and was anti-Japanese.  However, it received little financial 
and moral support from the Republic of Korea until the fall of the Syngman Rhee 
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government in April 1960.73  Between 1945 and 1960, the DPRK sent 1.2 trillion yen in 
education aide to its groups in Japan as compared with the 100 million provided by the 
ROK to its group.74  Hicks goes so far as to claim, to the contrary, that Rhee’s 
government was dependent upon Mindan.75   
While Chosoren and North Korea worked closely to attain their goals in Japan, 
Mindan and its home government often feuded, especially on the subject of Japan-Korean 
relations.  Some members of Mindan wanted South Korea to speed up normalization 
negotiations and come to an agreement with the Japanese to improve the position of 
Koreans in Japan.   Others were upset by the humiliating concessions that South Korea 
was making in normalization talks.  However, the most significant reason for Mindan’s 
relative weakness was that it did not have the ideological weapon of the Chosoren.  Its 
leaders were a prosperous and conservative middle-class group that did not identify with 
most Koreans in Japan.76     
5. “People of Chosun?”  
An interesting side note to Japanese fears of and treatment of ethnic Koreans as 
subversive and as a potential security risk involves the mistaken classification of Koreans 
after the war.  In February 1960, the 613,671 Koreans living in Japan comprised 90 
percent of the foreigners in Japan.  Of these, 444,586 were registered as citizens of the 
North Korea whereas 162,871 were citizens of South Korea.  (These figures do not 
include 25,723 Koreans who had been naturalized as Japanese citizens.)77  March 1953 
statistics show that 95 percent of the 600,000 Koreans remaining in Japan were from the 
south.  For example, 61 percent were from Kyungsang Province, 12 percent from Cheju 
Island, and 11 percent from Cholla.  But 1950 Ministry of Justice records show that 92.6 
percent of Koreans in Japan identified themselves as a Chosun-in, or “North Korean 
citizen.”  This is because the DPRK used the term Chosun and Koreans residing in Japan 
identified more easily with this ancient name for their homeland because it is the Korean 
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pronunciation of the Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese ideograph for Korea—
“Chosen.”  Thus, Koreans in Japan unwittingly identified with the North because they 
still considered themselves “people of Chosun.” 78 
The following chapter illustrates how the “people of Chosun” who identified with 
North Korea, unwittingly or not, greatly influenced Japan’s tumultuous relationships with 
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III. CHOSEN SOREN IN THE COLD WAR                  
A. INTRODUCTION 
After three years of the Korean conflict’s death and destruction established 
nothing, a “cold war” was re-declared on Korean peninsula.  Instead of physical combat, 
the Cold War in Korea was a zero-sum battle for political legitimacy between 
Pyongyang’s government in the north, backed by the USSR and China, and Seoul’s 
government in the south, supported by the United States and its main Asian ally, Japan.   
When Chosen Soren was officially founded in May 1955, nearly a decade after 
World War II ended, none of the governments in Tokyo, Seoul, or Pyongyang had 
established formal diplomatic relations yet.  In fact, it would take 10 more years of 
emotionally charged negotiations before Japan and South Korea finally exchanged 
ambassadors.  However, the ugly past between Japan and Korea was never far below the 
surface of Japan-Korea relations, especially since the living reminder of that past, the 
zainichi Koreans, were used as bargaining chips by all three countries throughout the 
Cold War.  While the two Koreas jockeyed to win the allegiance of the zainichi Koreans, 
Japan used its Korean population to alternately further its economic development (in its 
relations with North Korea) and antagonize its neighbor (in its relations with South 
Korea).   
B. THE CALCUTTA AGREEMENT 
South Korea was not a party to the San Francisco Peace Treaty because it was a 
colony of Japan during the war.  Instead, it was necessary for Tokyo and Seoul to 
negotiate an agreement to settle reparations for Japan’s colonization of Korea and 
establish relations on an equal, state-to-state basis.  Unfortunately, Korean President 
Syngman Rhee, who spent many years in exile during Japan’s occupation, hated the 
Japanese, and many high Japanese officials enjoyed reminding Koreans of their painful 
colonial experience.  Thus, it is not surprising that discussions on nearly every topic, 
especially those regarding zainichi Koreans, were acrimonious.  Despite frequent 
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harangues about the rights of Koreans in Japan, Rhee’s government offered very little in 
concrete support, especially when compared with Pyongyang.79    
While Seoul was embroiled in its contentious normalization talks, North Korea 
stayed above the fray by offering “sweetheart deals” that appealed to both zainichi 
Koreans and the Japanese government.  The resulting Calcutta Agreement was a huge 
diplomatic coup for Pyongyang, as it won the allegiance of thousands of zainichi 
Koreans, achieved virtual legitimization from Tokyo, and thoroughly embarrassed Seoul.   
1. Pyongyang’s Gains 
South Korea demanded that Japan pay compensation to Koreans who were in 
Japan during the war.  In contrast the DPRK waived compensation claims and offered to 
pay the entire cost of repatriation.  At the time, North Korea was progressing 
economically, while economic decay and political corruption were endemic in the South.  
The DPRK sweetened the deal with Cabinet Order 53, which stipulated a host of 
incentives for Koreans to return to the North, including monetary payments of 20,000 
won to adults and 10,000 won to children.  In August 1958, Kim Il Sung announced that 
all Koreans were welcome to return to the North.  Japanese Prime Minister Kishi 
Nobosuke’s government began negotiating with the DPRK in 1958 and gave its consent 
on February 13, 1959.  The International Red Cross ratified the repatriation plan in 
Calcutta, India on August 13, 1959.80   
Between December 14, 1959 and December 11, 1960, some 51,325 Koreans were 
repatriated to the North under the Calcutta Agreement.  Korean incentives for moving to 
the North, despite the fact that most were from the South, included employment, 
education, and improved living standards promised them.  Seventy-five percent of the 
Koreans who chose to go north were unemployed.  The discrimination they faced in 
Japanese society also factored into their decisions.81 
The Calcutta Agreement epitomizes how zainichi Koreans were used by leaders 
in Tokyo, Seoul, and Pyongyang to antagonize rival governments during the Cold War.  
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Japan was able to rid itself of a large number of a despised minority who, as welfare 
recipients, were a financial burden to Japan.  At the time Tokyo was engaged in very 
contentious talks to normalize relations with Syngman Rhee’s government, and Calcutta 
was the perfect way to “stick it” to Seoul.  Both Pyongyang and Seoul claimed to be the 
only legitimate government for Koreans on the peninsula as well as in Japan, so Calcutta 
amounted to South Korea losing citizens as well as losing face.  The Calcutta Agreement 
was a huge victory for North Korea.  In addition to receiving an influx of labor, 
negotiating and signing an internationally recognized agreement— with a US ally, no 
less—essentially established Pyongyang’s legitimacy in international circles.  
2. Tokyo’s Gains 
Because of discrimination, many Koreans in Japan lived near the poverty line.  
Between 1952 and 1963, Koreans received 2.7 trillion yen annually from Japanese social 
service agencies.  Koreans were ten times more likely to receive aid than Japanese.  The 
life of the average Korean had changed little from pre-war to post-war.  Many were 
unemployed.  Those who did have jobs were unskilled labor.  Others ran dance halls, 
pachinko parlors (similar to pinball), movie theaters, and restaurants.  Excluded from 
mainstream economic life, Koreans led a precarious existence vulnerable to periods of 
economic depression.  Thus, many turned to illicit manufacture of liquor and narcotic 
trafficking, explaining why the Korean crime rate was six times that of Japanese.82 
The Japanese claimed that they entered into the agreement on humanitarian 
grounds.  But it is clear that Japanese self-interests were helped by reducing the burden of 
welfare recipients, not having to pay repatriation expenses or reparation claims, and 
shipping out potentially subversive and disloyal elements, not to mention a despised 
minority group.   
3. Seoul’s Loss 
The Calcutta Agreement was also clearly a message to South Korea as it resulted 
in (1) the transfer of over 50,000 Koreans to North Korea (2) and the legitimization of 
North Korea by entering into an internationally recognized agreement—with an 
American ally, no less.  In eight years of contentious normalization talks, Seoul had used 
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zainichi Koreans in its game of diplomatic chess, but Japan tired of the game and 
removed the pieces.83   
Since the majority of the Koreans in Japan originally came from the south, the 
repatriation was no small embarrassment for the ROK.  In fact, South Korea was so 
incensed that it angrily threatened to sink all repatriation ships that sailed from Japanese 
ports.84  The repatriation program essentially scuttled the second round of the 
normalization talks between Japan and the Republic of Korea that began in early 1958.  
C. “NORMALIZED” RELATIONS 
Despite the lingering bitterness from the colonial era, Japan and South Korea 
developed a symbiotic economic relationship during the Cold War.  Japan provided a 
model for growth and supplied many of the capital goods needed for South Korea’s 
industrialization.  Japanese official development assistance, private investment, and 
important technology transfers to South Korea simultaneously benefited both countries.85  
Anything but smooth, the ROK-Japan relationship relied on the security ensured by the 
U.S. military to provide stability for economic growth.  Despite their economic 
interdependence and common security benefactor in the United States, the Japan-ROK 
Cold War relationship was one characterized by frequent diplomatic rows, many arising 
from Japan’s relations with North Korea and especially the relationship of Koreans in 
Japan to North Korea. 
1. Japan-ROK Normalization Treaty 
The Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty of 1965 was a tumultuous issue for all in 
Japan.  Chosen Soren and other left wing organizations opposed normalization because it 
would bind the ROK and Japan to a triangular relationship centered on the United States.  
Japanese opposed the implications of a treaty that might get Japan involved in another 
Korean peninsula conflict, contrary to the nation’s pacifist constitution.  Mindan opposed 
the treaty because of the humiliating concessions Park Chung Hee’s South Korean 
government was making.  A key area of dispute for the ROK government during 
negotiations was the legal status of Koreans in Japan.  Seoul wanted Japan to grant 
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zainichi Koreans residence rights and stop legal discrimination, as well as sever the link 
between Koreans in Japan and North Korea.86 
Normalization instantly tipped the scales of influence in favor of Mindan.  After 
normalization, Koreans in Japan were given five years to register as a North or South 
Korean.  Those who registered as South Koreans would receive permanent residence and 
foreign travel rights.87  The newly established ROK Embassy and Mindan cooperated 
closely to issue passports to Republic of Korea nationals and help establish other social 
services.  But Chosen Soren members remain stateless today, as Japan and the DPRK 
have yet to establish formal ties.  While Mindan’s relevance is limited to cultural and 
sociological studies, the “overseas citizens of the DPRK” affiliated with Chosen Soren 
have left an indelible mark on Japan’s relations with both governments on the Korean 
Peninsula.88 
2. “A Significant Problem” 
Almost immediately after the normalization treaty was signed on June 22, 1965, 
the ROK and Japan clashed over Japan’s relations with Kim Il Sung’s regime, namely 
Japanese exports to the North and travel of Chosen Soren members between Japan and 
the DPRK.  Incensed South Korean officials tried to obstruct travel between Japan and 
the ROK, and both sides wasted no time in using their newly constituted state-to-state 
relationship to file formal protests and threaten to recall ambassadors.89  It should come 
as no surprise that Seoul’s severe reaction to Japan’s reentry policies prompted the CIA 
to cite this as a significant problem between the two countries in December 1965 and 
February 1966.90   
Indeed, the ink on the normalization treaty had hardly dried when Japanese Prime 
Minister Sato’s cabinet began researching how to increase trade with North Korea to an 
annual level of $100 million.91  In what was to become a typical pattern in Japanese 
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politics throughout the Cold War, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officials were 
opposed to increasing trade with North Korea because of its adverse implications on 
relations with the ROK.   The Ministry of Justice also had reservations because of the 
security concerns of allowing free travel between the DPRK and Japan.  But key Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) politicians, who received some financial support from Chosen 
Soren, eventually overlooked these concerns to satisfy constituents and keep money 
flowing into party coffers.92   
Trade between Japan and North Korea in Fiscal Year (FY) 1964 was already $32 
million—2.2 times the amount of trade in FY 1963.  Increases in sales of Japan's steel, 
textiles, chemical and pharmaceutical products, and machinery and instruments to North 
Korea and increases in Japanese imports of North Korean iron ore, electrolytic zinc, 
maize, and pig iron accounted for the burgeoning trade.93  Also, in May-June 1964, Japan 
was the first capitalist country to participate in Pyongyang’s annual international trade 
fair, displaying 359 commodities worth nearly 374 million yen (a little over $1 million at 
the prevailing exchange rate at the time).   
In January 1969, the Japan-North Korea Trade Association completed an 
agreement—negotiations for which began around the time of the normalization of ROK-
Japan relations—to export $40 million worth of machine tools, mining machinery, meters 
and gauges, and plant equipment to North Korea.  Seoul strongly voiced its concern about 
“dual-use applications of equipment and technology that could boost North Korea’s 
military potential.”94   
Later that year the Japanese government pacified Seoul by withdrawing its 
support to subsidize Japanese participation in a North Korean science and technology 
fair.  Japan also denied visa requests for a 73-person Chosen Soren delegation to North 
Korea and did not grant visas for North Koreans to attend the 1969 Japanese Communist 
Party convention.  However, in February 1970, the World Health Organization 
investigated claims that a Japanese company had delivered orders of anthrax, cholera, and 
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the plague to North Korea.  Although findings were negative, the investigation did 
disclose that 11 Japanese firms were smuggling electronic parts into the DPRK.95   
3. Seiki Bunri (Separation of Politics from Economics) 
An irritated South Korea constantly criticized Japan’s "two-Koreas" policy, which 
normalization was supposed to prevent, especially since the treaty acknowledged the 
ROK as the "sole legal government on the Korean peninsula."96  ROK-Japan relations 
were characterized by frequent protests from Seoul against "unfriendly acts" and 
"breaches" of the normalization treaty in Japan's approaches to North Korea.  Examples 
included Tokyo's policy of stamping "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" in 
passports of Japanese traders going to North Korea. The resumption of the repatriation of 
ethnic Koreans to the DPRK in 1971 after the original accord (the Calcutta Agreement) 
expired in 1967 also greatly angered Seoul (up to that point 88,600 had gone).97  
The Japanese referred to their policy toward both governments on the Korean 
peninsula as part of its seikei bunri (separation of politics from economics) strategy in use 
worldwide.98  Japanese companies involved in North Korea also reacted to Seoul’s 
criticisms by insisting that they were only interested in profit, not politics.  Thus, South 
Koreans began denouncing their Japanese neighbor as a very clever "economic animal."99   
Despite the name calling, and perhaps adding to its bitterness, was the fact that 
South Korea was still very dependent on Japan for its economic development.  Included 
in the terms of the 1965 Normalization Treaty were Japanese war damage reparations to 
South Korea.  Japan agreed to provide Seoul with $300 million in grants and $200 
million in soft loans on a 10-year installment basis beginning in 1966.  By 1970, Japan 
was South Korea’s second largest source of foreign funds, providing $13.1 million in 
government loans and $85.6 million in commercial loans for 144 projects.   In particular, 
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Japan supplied $123.7 million of the $210 million price tag of South Korea's first 
integrated steel and iron mill.100   
In 1972, Japanese goods accounted for 39 percent of ROK imports as most of 
South Korea’s raw materials and capital goods arrived from Japan.  In addition, easier 
Japanese loans and grants, geographical proximity and cheaper freight charges resulted in 
a lop-sided trade ratio (1:3.5) in favor of Japan.101  After enduring 36 years of colonial 
occupation; witnessing Japan’s economic boom aided by the Korean War; feeling 
shortchanged on its war reparations; and jealously watching Japan’s continued flirtation 
with the North, South Koreans looked upon their neighbor with rancor while holding out 
their hands for assistance.  
But the flashpoint for the next ROK-Japan diplomatic row was a Japanese 
parliamentary delegation’s visit to Pyongyang in January 1972—the first in the post-war 
era. The visit resulted in a memorandum trade agreement calling for an increase in the 
two-way volume of trade to $520 million by 1976, 10 times the amount of trade in 1972. 
Japan and North Korea also proposed opening a North Korean trade office in Japan; 
beginning regular shipping services between the two countries; and increasing the scale 
of North Korean farm and fishery exports to Japan.102  Additionally, South Korea was 
growing increasingly irritated by improved Japanese-DPRK trade relations, which 
increased from $58.4 million to $376 million from 1971 to 1974.103  Analysts at the time 
contended that Japan was attempting to boost trade with the DPRK in hopes of 
normalizing its relations with Kim Il Sung’s government.104    
4. Japan: “Relay Station for Communist Activities” 
South Korea also feared that improvements in Japan-DPRK relations would only 
come at the expense of Japanese-South Korean relations “and a weakening of the anti-
communist deterrent on the peninsula.”  Japan’s perspective was that forging ties with 
North Korea would simultaneously expand markets while reducing the security threat to 
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Japan.  Prime Minister Tanaka even advocated a Japanese foreign policy of balanced 
treatment of the two Koreas in a November 1972 Diet speech.105   
By this time, Park Chung Hee’s government was becoming more oppressive as its 
paranoia about security and frustration with its inability to control the Korean community 
in Japan grew.  In 1972, South Korea, angered by what was considered overly favorable 
coverage of the DPRK in the Japanese press, closed the Yomiuri Shinbun’s (newspaper) 
Seoul offices, banned its circulation in South Korea, and expelled its correspondents.106  
Meanwhile, the government-controlled South Korean media continued churning out 
reports about northern "spy rings" and "spy schools" in Japan.107  
Seoul continually argued that lackadaisical Japanese reentry policies were a 
security threat since these individuals could freely travel to South Korea after gaining 
entry to Japan.108  Issuing reentry visas to Chosen Soren members encouraged North 
Korean espionage, training, and infiltration activities against the South.109  South Korean 
fears were not unfounded.  Between April 1971 and February 1976, 36 Koreans from 
Japan were incarcerated for violating South Korean political laws, including six who 
received death sentences.110  Indeed, Kim Il Sung’s 1972 New Year’s Day Speech 
emphasized the importance of Chosen Soren to DPRK foreign policy: 
Korean nationals in Japan should fight unyieldingly to expedite the peaceful 
unification of the homeland….  Korean nationalists in Japan should smash 
up the spying acts and all the subversive activities of the United States and 
Japanese reactionaries and the factionalists, further consolidate their ranks, 
rally themselves closely around the Chongryun and wage a vigorous 
struggle.111 
 
a. The Kim Dae Jung Affair 
By the early 1970s, Koreans in Japan were complaining that both South 
and North Korea were not helping but merely trying to use them.  The kidnapping of 
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South Korean opposition leader Kim Dae Jung by the Korean CIA from his Tokyo hotel 
room on 8 August 1973 disillusioned many Koreans in Japan and severely threatened 
political and economic ties between the ROK and Japan.112   Japanese public opinion felt 
that both Seoul and Tokyo were more interested in compromising on a political 
settlement rather than a legal probe, which could have implicated the ROK government 
and Japanese rightist underground operators.113  
The New York Times reported, “The Kim Dae Jung affair has revived 
resentments springing from the legacy of 40 years of Japanese colonial rule of Korea—in 
the Koreans their hatred and distrust of the Japanese, in the Japanese their contempt and 
scorn for the Koreans.”  During this period relations hit a low point, as Japan criticized 
South Korea for exaggerating security threats to justify its authoritarian regime.   South 
Korea attacked Japan’s equidistant policy as one that “intended to perpetuate the division 
of the peninsula and keep Koreans subservient to Japan.”114   
b. Park Assassination Attempt 
On August 15, 1974, a zainichi Korean named Mun Se Kwang attempted 
to assassinate Park Chung Hee as he delivered an address commemorating Korean 
Liberation Day.  (Although he missed Park, he did kill the First Lady.)  Predictably, an 
indignant South Korea immediately pointed the finger at North Korean operatives in 
Japan, while Tokyo denied the accusations.  The crisis was further inflamed by the 
comments of the Japanese foreign minister, a very defensive Toshio Kimura.  On August 
19, Kimura said there was no threat from the North to South Korea.  Then, on September 
5, 1974, Kimura added that Seoul was not the only legitimate government on the Korean 
peninsula.115  Kimura’s comments were certainly intended to deflect criticism away from 
Tokyo by making use of South Korean insecurities. 
Investigation quickly determined that Mun, a Japanese resident, had 
received instructions and financial compensation from pro-North Korea groups in Japan.   
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The attempt on Park’s life seemed to validate ROK complaints that Japan’s “weak 
posture toward pro-North Korean groups in Japan was making the country a ‘relay station 
for communist activities.’”116  The “assassination attempt” crisis was settled when an 
embarrassed Japanese government sent special emissary Shiina Etsusaburo to Seoul.  
Shiina, an elder statesman and former foreign minister, pledged that Japan would 
improve the monitoring of political groups within Japan.  Specifically, the Shiina 
Memorandum stated that private internal activities critical of any specific foreign 
government would not be permitted in Japan became official Japanese government 
policy.117  Implicitly, it obligated Japan to crack down on Chosen Soren’s political 
diatribes against Park’s regime.   
D. THE TIDE TURNS AGAINST CHOSEN SOREN AND THE DPRK 
The Kim Dae Jung kidnapping and attempted assassination of Park Chung Hee 
were very serious crises in a most contentious first decade of formal Japan-ROK 
diplomatic ties.  As the Cold War progressed, relations between Seoul and Tokyo 
gradually improved because South Korea’s position vis-à-vis North Korea improved.  
International developments, and specifically developments on the Korean Peninsula, 
would begin to test the loyalty of Chosen Soren members for the remainder of the Cold 
War.    
1. Seoul’s Propaganda Victories  
In the mid-1970s, Seoul began winning the battle for the hearts and minds of 
Koreans in Japan with an ingenious campaign of “home visits” by zainichi Koreans to    
visit relatives and ancestral homes while also showcasing the modernity of South Korea.  
The National Unification Promotion Association in Seoul cooperated with Mindan to 
help sponsor the trips, which targeted Chosen Soren members.  The two-week tour 
started from the bustling capital of Seoul, ran along the brand new highway down to 
Pusan, then wound its way through the industrial complexes of Ulsan and Pohang.  
Fittingly, the tour ended with a visit to the shrine of Admiral Yi Sun-shin, the Korean 
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national hero who stopped Hideyoshi’s invading Japanese forces way back in the 
sixteenth century. 
The program successfully presented the image of an economically vibrant South 
Korea, a politically proud and ego-boosting motherland.  Participants of both the North 
and South’s propaganda programs remarked that the very open southern tour left quite a 
positive impression compared to their staid and structured experience in the North.118   
Over 1500 zainichi Koreans connected with Chosen Soren visited South Korea in 
November 1975.  Upon returning to Japan, many participants joined Mindan.  One 
Korean man stated:  “The Chochongryun will be dissolved within two or three years.  Its 
officials are obviously well paid by North Korea and their operations certainly include 
espionage which the Japanese authorities should probe more closely."119  
Prominent spy defections also verified long-time Seoul complaints that Koreans 
in Japan were spying for North Korea.  Pak Hi Gyun, 54 (Asami Noboru is his Japanese 
name), confessed to meeting with Korean communist agents in East Berlin in 1973 in the 
hope that he would be allowed to meet his brother, who lived in the North.  Although Pak 
claimed that he did not actively engage in espionage, his information about contact and 
recruitment methods was enlightening to officials in Seoul and Tokyo.   Kim Chang Jil, 
31, also admitted to his active association with North Korean agents when he was a 
student at Yonsei University in Seoul.  Kim told investigators that he had been trained for 
three months in communist espionage and subversion at the Chosen Soren central 
institute.  "The Chochongyon instigates young Koreans in Japan to become anti-Seoul 
propagandists by providing false information about the Republic of Korea," he said.  
Lastly, Shin Sang Dae, a vice-chairman of Chosen Soren, was implicated as a key figure 
in communist espionage activities in South Korea by captured spies in South Korea.  
Shin’s involvement included recruiting Koreans in Japan and dispatching them to North 
Korea for training.120  
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2. Chinks in Chosen Soren’s Armor121 
As early as twenty years ago, analysts began predicting Chosen Soren’s demise. 
In August 1982, the Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) featured an article on Chosen 
Soren.  At the time, Chosen Soren sponsored 19 corporations and two trading firms, one 
university, 12 high schools, 56 middle schools and 85 primary schools in Japan. The 
Chosen Soren-run Korean Credit Association boasted 161 branches and 300,000 
customers (approximately half of the 600,000 Koreans living in Japan), serviced by 
23,500 employees. Total deposits were estimated at $2.65 billion.  
Chosen Soren claimed 435,000 dues-paying members and 49 chapters, or one for 
every prefecture and municipality in Japan.122  Mindan's registered membership was 
397,600.  And while membership figures may not have added up, both sides agreed that 
nearly 100 percent of Chosen Soren's members were originally from southern Korea.  
Chosen Soren’s main emphasis was to maintain the national pride and identity of 
Koreans in Japan and to prevent Koreans from becoming assimilated into Japanese 
society.  In contrast, Mindan was very active in lobbying for Koreans to get full civil and 
human rights in Japan.  
In addition to discussing the unique activities of the nearly self-sufficient and self-
contained community, FEER also reported on the dark side of Chosen Soren, including 
its alleged espionage activities for North Korea, both in Japan and in South Korea.  A 
secret group within Chosen Soren, called Rodong, was thought to lead the nefarious 
activities of the association, sometimes under direct orders from Pyongyang. There were 
also suspicions that Chosen Soren members were involved in kidnapping Japanese 
citizens.  Japanese immigration officials estimated that 5,000 people a year illegally 
traveled to North Korea for revolutionary training, sightseeing or for permanent 
immigration.   
Some Japanese Government officials also accused Chosen Soren of extorting its 
own members in order to remit much-needed hard currency to the North.  Mindan 
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officials corroborated these statements by claiming that pro-North residents of Japan 
were growing increasingly reluctant to send money to North Korea.  Mindan implied that 
much of the 5 billion yen that Korean businessmen sent to North Korea in honor of Kim 
Il Sung's 70th birthday party in 1982 was not sent voluntarily.   
Japanese authorities also stated that many Chosen Soren members were leaving 
the organization, or abandoning active support for it, after visiting North Korea and 
seeing conditions there.  Mindan claimed that Chosen Soren was splintering into two 
factions: one favoring the succession of Kim's son, Kim Jung Il, as president of North 
Korea after the older Kim dies, the other opposed to the younger Kim.  Lastly, there were 
doubts expressed about whether Chosen Soren would be able to maintain its status among 
either Koreans in Japan or with North Korea as the younger generations of zainichi 
Koreans identified more with being Japanese.   
By 1986, Japan's economic relations with North Korea remain stalled by 
unresolved debt problems.  North Korea owed Japanese banks 60 billion yen as a result 
of its import splurge in the early 1970s.  Despite the lofty goals of 15 years earlier, Japan-
DPRK trade in FY 1984 and 1985 was only 100 billion yen, with 80 percent of that trade 
conducted by North Korean residents in Japan using contacts and financing channels 
which eluded Japanese trading companies.123 
Despite this, Japan’s policy toward North Korea continued to be the most 
disruptive factor in Tokyo-Seoul relations for the remainder of the Cold War.124  The 
Nakasone cabinet of the 1980s sought to secure stability on the Korean peninsula by 
inducing Pyongyang’s interaction with the West.   Tokyo claimed that isolation and lack 
of dialogue heightened the North’s fears of encirclement and isolation and increased the 
likelihood of lashing out in a hostile manner.  Again, South Korea criticized the 
“economic animal” for attempting to “free-ride” on ROK-U.S. defense efforts.125 
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3. Chosen Soren at the End of the Cold War   
International developments, and specifically developments on the Korean 
Peninsula, continued to wear at Chosen Soren’s membership numbers for the remainder 
of the Cold War.   First, the tours of South Korea sponsored by Mindan and even free 
travel by individuals clearly showed that the South was not as bad off as depicted in 
Northern propaganda.  Those who had the opportunity to visit both countries could easily 
decide for themselves that the South had surpassed the North, a conclusion that was 
supported by composite economic indicators of national production.  Despite South 
Korea’s dynamic economic growth, both Mindan and Chosen Soren were critical of Park 
Chung Hee’s draconian rule, which ended with his assassination in 1979.  Park’s 
successor, Chun Doo Hwan, gradually extended human rights and social welfare.  South 
Korea’s subsequent democratically elected leader, Roh Tae Woo, further liberalized the 
personal freedoms of South Koreans.  While Chun was never very popular and Roh's 
election victory was due to the fragmentation of the opposition, there was no doubt that 
both the standard of living and the level of justice in South Korea had risen considerably.  
South Korea’s proudest moment was hosting the 1988 Olympics, which displayed South 
Korea’s high standard of living and level of overall development for the whole world, 
including Koreans in Japan, to see.126   
 At the same time, illusions about life in North Korea were being smashed.  
Through letters sent by their relatives in North Korea, Korean residents in Japan learned 
that the North was clearly an impoverished police state.  Students in Chosen Soren-run 
schools easily recognized the disparities between their political education that espoused 
totalitarian North Korea’s brand of communism (known as juche, or self-reliance) and the 
reality of the successful market economies of democratic Japan and South Korea.  
 In 1990, the Japanese media began reporting on the plight of zainichi Koreans 
who had returned to North Korea.  Initially, returnees were welcome in North Korea not 
only because of the hard currency they brought with them, but also because they could be 
used to extort funds from their affluent relatives in Japan.  And because they came from 
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Japan, they were considered potentially subversive.  Hostages in every sense of the word, 
repatriates were also held responsible for the action of their relatives in Japan, explaining 
why Koreans in Japan were reluctant to speak out against the DPRK. 
 But Koreans in Japan were also caught up in the wave of pro-democracy 
movements that swept across the globe in 1990.  A rally against Kim Il Sung was held in 
downtown Tokyo in late May. The organizers were all former prominent officials of 
Chosen Soren whose stated goal was to get the organization, as well as individuals, to 
stop sending money to North Korea, and thus deprive Pyongyang of its best source of 
hard currency. 
The anti-DPRK and anti-Chosen Soren protestors were slightly ahead of their 
time, although those who joined their cause did so for various reasons.  Four years later, 
the world, and especially the United States, would become interested in cutting off funds 
to North Korea due to the security threat Pyongyang posed to the region.  It would take 
nearly a decade before the government of Japan took steps to stem the flow of money to 
North Korea, for financial reasons.  And it would take another 12 years until the rest of 
Japan felt the same sense of anger and betrayal toward Chosen Soren that these former 
members had in 1990.  The following chapter details the fall of Chosen Soren in the post-















IV. THE FALL OF CHOSEN SOREN 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Perhaps Chosen Soren would have quietly faded away as another Cold War 
anachronism or a reminder of discrimination in Japanese society.  Reducing that 
possibility, it certainly seems that Japanese officials would have continued to treat 
Chosen Soren as Pyongyang’s quasi-diplomatic agency in Tokyo until Japan-DPRK 
normalization occurred.  Unfortunately, tensions in Northeast Asia have been high since 
North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Non Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) in March 1993.  North Korea, once thought of as just the weird, reclusive 
neighbor, became the unpredictable and threatening neighbor.   
Over the last ten years, an increasingly desperate and isolated Pyongyang has 
grown progressively more sinister and hostile.  As a result, Tokyo’s 50 year-old policy of 
overlooking Chosen Soren’s fund-raising activities and legal transgressions in support of 
the DPRK was challenged with each North Korean provocation.  In 1997, the Japanese 
government confirmed decades of rumors by officially implicating North Korea in the 
kidnapping of Japanese citizens during the 1970s and 1980s.  Also, Japan’s decade-long 
recession made Japanese taxpayers unwilling to continue to bail out Korean credit unions 
bankrupted by making illegal money transfers to the DPRK.    
In September 2002, North Korean leader Kim Jung Il, who succeeded his father in 
1994, hammered the final nail into Chosen Soren’s coffin when he admitted that North 
Korea had kidnapped Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s.  The backlash from the 
Japanese public spurred Tokyo to swiftly block Chosen Soren’s ability to aid the DPRK.   
The way these developments have effectively eradicated Chosen Soren as viable and 






B. THE 1994 NUCLEAR CRISIS127 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 truly devastated the North Korean 
economy.128  The end of the communist bloc meant the end of the trade discounts, 
bartering, and “friendship prices” that North Korea had been dependent on since its 
inception.  Unfortunately, North Korea’s limited trade relations with a small number of 
non-communist countries resembled its debt-plagued trade relations with Japan.  Since 
Pyongyang had made no effort to repay outstanding debts it had accrued since the 1970s, 
it was regarded as untrustworthy and remained on the outside of a burgeoning global 
market from which many other Asian countries were benefiting.   With the world turned 
upside down, its economy in tatters, and well-aware that South Korea had far surpassed 
it, North Korea suffered yet another shocking psychological blow.  China—the only 
nation that North Korea could even remotely call a friend—began cultivating ties with 
Pyongyang’s archenemy in Seoul.   China’s transformation into a free-market economy 
resulted in its normalization of relations with Seoul and a great increase in trade with 
South Korea (China is now South Korea’s largest trading partner).129    
North Korea’s feeling of isolation and desperation in the new world order 
precipitated the 1994 crisis over the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons.  Only a 
last minute intervention by former President Jimmy Carter in June 1994 prevented a US 
preemptive strike and the eruption of a second Korean War.   The crisis resulted in three 
significant developments.  The immediate outcome of the incident was that North Korea, 
desperate for energy, received a pledge from the United States to build two light water 
nuclear reactors and provide 500,000 tons of oil per year until the reactors were 
constructed.  In exchange, Pyongyang agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons program.130   
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The crisis also revealed that the US-Japan Security Alliance needed to be updated to 
reflect the post-Cold War security environment, resulting in the 1997 Revised Guidelines 
for US-Japan Security Cooperation.  The changes announced in 1997 updated the Cold 
War principle that Japan would only react to a direct attack against its territory by 
introducing the concept that Japan would actively cooperate with the United States to 
address regional threats.131  Finally, in addition to prompting Japan to take a more active 
role in regional security, the 1994 crisis led many to examine how to best minimize the 
threat of the reclusive and unpredictable DPRK.  An easy way to eliminate the danger of 
a country with almost no legitimate trading partners and a moribund economy was to 
deny it the money necessary to feed its million-man army and procure or develop 
weapons.  Funding of such a belligerent and menacing regime became a topic of interest 
for many analysts and policy makers.  Japan’s economic ties with North Korea became 
heavily scrutinized.  All too frequently, the money trail led directly to Chosen Soren.   
C. ECONOMIC TIES  
 Japan’s economic ties with North Korea through Chosen Soren business 
enterprises were blamed for helping finance the DPRK’s nuclear program during the 
1994 crisis.132  Although Japan devoted enormous intelligence resources to tracking 
North Korean activities on its soil, it did little to control the money flow to the DPRK.  
Some critics claimed Tokyo deliberately ignored the money flow to avoid confrontation 
with North Korea and to avoid being seen as discriminating against zainichi Koreans.133 
1. Money Flow 
 In a presentation before the Japanese Diet (Parliament) in March 1994, the 
director-general of the Public Security Investigation Agency (PSIA) stated that Chosen 
Soren was remitting 60-80 billion yen ($650-850 million at exchange rates then 
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prevailing) per year.134  Sato Katsumi, head of the Modern Korean Institute in Tokyo and 
an expert on North Korea, suggested that the annual inflow from Japan (his estimate was 
$747 million) was twice as much as Pyongyang’s annual budget.135  Han Kwang Hui, a 
former Chosen Soren senior official, confirmed, “It is an absolute fact that a huge amount 
of money flowed into North Korea from Japan every year.”136   
 It appears that North Korea planned to ride Japan’s economic success to fund its 
own military buildup.   According to Pak To Ging, a former economics professor at 
Chosen Soren’s Korea University in Tokyo, Chosen Soren’s heavy involvement in the 
Japanese economy began in the 1980s when the DPRK embarked on developing 
plutonium-type nuclear weapons.  The government needed a huge amount of money to 
pursue the project, prompting Kim Il Sung to issue a proclamation on September 15, 
1986, encouraging Chosen Soren to expand businesses and make a profit in order to 
provide financial support to the regime.137  In his 2002 book, The Crime and Punishment 
of My Chongryun, Han Kwang Hui asserts that Kim Il Sung’s “September instruction” 
was “an epoch-making event” for Chosen Soren.  The alliance of Chosen Soren’s Joint 
Venture Research Association and its counterpart in Pyongyang spawned 39 industries, 
which included forays in pharmaceuticals, trading, insurance, and even a news agency.138  
Donghe Trading Company alone accounted for nearly 30 percent of Japan’s trade with 
the DPRK ($518 million) in 1996.  The Korea-Japan Export-Import Company was 
practically Pyongyang’s overseas trading arm, importing machinery and construction 
equipment for the North.139 
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2. Pachinko140 
Japan’s popular pachinko parlors were also fingered as a culprit in propping up 
Kim Jung Il’s menacing regime.  The pachinko industry is dominated by Koreans, and it 
is estimated that 30 percent of pachinko owners have ties to North Korea.  In 1996 the 
pachinko industry grossed more than $275 billion a year, more than the worldwide sales 
of Japan’s auto industry at the time.  Han Chang-woo, president of Maruhan Corporation, 
a leading pachinko company, said in a 1996 interview, “Everyone knows that some of the 
money has probably gone to North Korea’s effort to build nuclear weapons.  Some 
pachinko owners linked to North Korea would like to cut those ties.  But if they do, their 
relatives in North Korea will suffer.  It’s as if North Korea is holding hostages.”141  
Following Kim Il Sung’s “September instruction” in 1986, Chosen Soren’s 
central headquarters entered the pachinko industry with gusto.  Han Kwang Hui 
established a special training program at the Institute of the Association of Korean Credit 
Unions in Japan.  Han also handpicked Chosen Soren’s brightest young professionals to 
participate in the "Pachinko Management Seminar."  By the early 1990s, Chosen Soren 
was finding it increasingly difficult to subsist on the steadily decreasing amount of 
donations from its dwindling membership.  Thus, it directed local chapters to enter the 
pachinko industry and manage their companies in the same manner that central 
headquarters did.142   
Currently, there are 40 locally run pachinko parlors operated by Chosen Soren-
affiliated organizations in addition to 20 parlors run directly by central headquarters.  Han 
asserts that these 60 pachinko parlors raise funds for almost all Chosen Soren activities.  
In some districts, earnings from a single pachinko parlor are covering salaries of all full-
time workers at the prefectural headquarters, its branches, and schoolteachers.  In Chiba 
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Prefecture, all operational expenses of the organization are covered by profits earned by a 
single pachinko parlor named "Jumbo" in Yachiyo City.143 
3. Meeting with Kim Jung Il 
 Chosen Soren’s importance in supporting the DPRK is obvious from transcripts 
of a meeting between North Korean leader Kim Jung Il and Chosen Soren officials who 
were visiting one of his villas on 25 April 25 1998 (Kim assumed leadership of the 
DPRK after his father’s death in 1994).  During the conversation, Kim told Chosen Soren 
that the “fatherland” needs Japanese seeds, especially those that do not require much 
fertilizer.  He also requested that Chosen Soren “acquire excellent species of domestic 
animals in Japan and send them to the fatherland.”  Later, the North Korean dictator 
commented that Japan’s economic recession would be a good opportunity to buy 
equipment and technology from the many small and medium companies going bankrupt.  
Kim Jung Il was equally aware of pachinko’s contributions to the DPRK:   
According to data furnished by the Japanese wretches, the annual sales 
volume in Pachinko parlors nationwide amounts to 30 trillion yen.  When 
converted into dollars, this is equivalent to about $250 billion.  
Nationwide, Pachinko parlors generate 30 trillion yen a year. This is a 
huge industry.  Korean nationals are said to account for about 70 percent 
of those involved in the Pachinko business and about 33 percent of them 
are Chongryun-affiliated Korean residents.  This being the case, Pachinko 
business can be said to be one of the main business areas for Chongryun-
affiliated businessmen.144 
 
4. The Credit Union Scandal 
The 1990s are known as “Japan’s lost decade.”  Economists knew that after over 
three decades of positive performance, Japan’s economy would eventually have to slow 
down.  But the Japanese, just as amazed as the rest of the world by Japan’s incredible 
post-war growth, saw no end in sight to their good fortune.  The reckless investments of 
businessmen and the loose lending practices of bank managers were a bad combination.  
Japan’s economic boom came to a sudden halt when its overheated economy crashed in 
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1990.145  Unfortunately, most real estate investment was financed by loans against 
overvalued property.  When the market corrected itself, many companies found 
themselves hopelessly in debt and many banks were saddled with nonperforming loans, a 
situation that continues to plague Japan today.   
a. Chogins Make Money for North Korea 
After the collapse of Japan’s bubble economy, money sent from Korean 
businesses in Japan to North Korea also dropped.  According to Sato Katsumi, “The end 
of bubble economy in Japan is at root of the economic crisis in North Korea.”146  Korean 
credit unions (known as chogin in Japanese) made up the deficit by making money—
literally.  Chogin played a key role in monetary remittances to the DPRK by illegally 
creating ghost accounts and making fraudulent loans to hide money funneled to 
Pyongyang.147  
  Typical practices included making a loan to a businessman for 250 million 
yen instead of the 200 million yen he asked for.  The extra money was essentially a 
forced donation to Chosen Soren.  The chogins also required their thousands of 
employees to secretly kick back 10 percent of their bonuses.  The money was then 
transferred—untaxed and all in cash— to North Korea by ship (the Man Gyong Bong-
92).148   
  Additionally, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported that audits of Korean credit 
associations were "virtually nonexistent," quoting a former auditor as saying he did not 
thoroughly audit them because he was always "afraid of human rights and discrimination 
accusations."149  Chogins were established in the early postwar period when Koreans 
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pooled their money together because of the discriminatory lending practices of Japanese 
banks.  For decades, Tokyo turned a blind eye to financial impropriety, partly out of a 
vague sense of guilt toward Chosen Soren and potential backlash from the Korean 
community.  It also did not hurt that Chosen Soren had also developed close ties with the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the political monolith that has dominated the Japanese 
government since the end of World War II.150 
  As one might expect, the credit unions lost billions and eventually went 
bankrupt.   There were once 38 credit unions serving the Korean community, but as they 
faced insolvency, smaller credit unions were absorbed into larger ones, which in turn 
became insolvent.  By August 2001, 35 chogins had collapsed since the mid-1990s.151   
b. Cleaning Up the Credit Union Mess 
  All told, Japanese taxpayers spent an estimated $10 billion to clean up the 
defunct credit unions, and after nearly a decade of zero economic growth, the Japanese 
literally could no longer afford to turn ignore the Chosen Soren embezzlement 
operation.152  In November 2001, police raided Chosen Soren’s headquarters in Tokyo 
and arrested the former head finance official as well as 14 former chogin executives for 
embezzlement and covering up bad loans.  This action was significant for two reasons: 
(1) it demonstrated Tokyo’s resolve to enforce its laws, regardless of the sensitive nature 
of Japanese-zainichi Korean relations, and (2) it marked the end of Chosen Soren’s 
pseudo-diplomatic immunity, as Chosen Soren headquarters had been treated as the 
DPRK’s de facto embassy until that point.   
The chairman of the Korean Credit Unions Association in Japan, Li Jong 
Ho, told prosecutors that Chosen Soren executives instructed him to cover up bad loans 
incurred at various chogins as a result of the illegal money transfers.153   An investigation 
of Tokyo Chogin found 177 fictitious accounts totaling almost 500 million yen while also 
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concealing 2.4 billion yen in Non Performing Loans (NPLs).154  Records also showed 
that six credit unions in the Kinki region (the cities of Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto) had funneled 
15 billion yen into Chosen Soren from the time they were established in the 1950s until 
the last one collapsed in 1997.155 
  After repeated chogin failures and reorganizations, the Japanese 
government’s final restructuring plan in 2002 required chogin to abide by three rules:  (1) 
Chosen Soren members were forbidden from serving as chogin executives (2) chogin 
were prohibited from making loans to Chosen Soren, and (3) chogin were ordered to cut 
all relations with Chosen Soren.156  Although Japan took these measures primarily for 
financial reasons, limiting Pyongyang’s cash flow was also a proactive measure to stymie 
the DPRK’s military expenditures.  
5. Shipping   
 If money was not flowing from Japan to North Korea through business ventures 
or embezzlement, it was simply carried across the sea aboard special ships that regularly 
traveled between the DPRK and Japan.  The ships allowed zainichi Koreans to visit 
relatives and conduct business in their homeland, and it was important to Pyongyang as a 
conduit of hard currency, among other things.   
The Man Gyong Bong-92, a 9762-ton passenger liner, was commissioned in 1992 
to replace the Samjiyon.   Man Gyong Bong-92 was built in North Korea with roughly 
$40 million in donations from Korean residents of Japan.157  At the height of its 
operations, from the mid-80s to the late-90s, the North Korean ship made about 30 round 
trips a year between its homeport in Wonsan and Niigata, Japan.  Han Kwang Hui stated 
that almost all of the funds remitted illegally from Japan were carried in cash on the 
Niigata-Wonson sea route.  Han related that “the huge amount of cash was divided into 
                                                 
154 James Simms,  “North Korean ties Complicate Japan’s Efforts to Clean Up Banks,” The Wall 
Street Journal.  4 Apr. 2002, <ww2gol.com/users/coynerhm/ north_korean_ties_ complicate_ japan_ 
banks.htm>, 29 November 2002. 
155 “Chogins Reportedly Funneled 15 Billion Yen to Pro-Pyongyang Chongryun,” in FBIS.  
156 Interview with Shibui Naomi, Political/Economic Section, American Consulate-General, Osaka-
Kobe, 19 June 2003, Osaka, Japan.   
157 David P. Hamilton, “Ferry Represents Lifeline for North Korea --- Expatriates Bring the Trappings 
of Capitalism From Japan,” Wall Street Journal, 6 May 1994, p. A10. 
 48
small paper bags or the like to avoid attention, each containing 20 million yen to 30 
million yen.   The small bags were then carried by ordinary compatriots embarking on the 
ship to visit their relatives and others in North Korea.”158   
Although Japan’s foreign exchange law required passengers to declare when over 
five million yen (approximately $50,000) in cash was carried, parcels were never 
inspected.159  One long-time observer claimed, “Japan’s customs did not check the 
passenger’s baggage.  They seemed to be trying to avoid troubles with passengers.”160  
Moreover, Chosen Soren bribes ensured that money couriers completed their duties 
without incident.  Han relates that Chosen Soren “won the hearts of the Niigata Customs 
House through feasts and so forth at usual times.  Therefore, from the outset, the customs 
house did not seem to have the intent to examine those hand-carried items.”161  
 Former Chosen Soren supporters also asserted that the ship smuggled the 
sophisticated electronic equipment, computer parts, software and machine tools that 
North Korea used to develop its missile programs.  The Tokyo Metropolitan Police 
Department claims the Man Gyong Bong-92 carries espionage orders to Chosen Soren-
backed North Korean agents in Japan.  Police also said the Samjiyon may have had a role 
in the 1974 assassination attempt on Park Chung Hee.162  Han’s book confirms these 
accusations, as he describes how a high ranking official, known as the “leading captain” 
(because even on the ship, he outranks the ship’s captain) personally transmits 
Pyongyang’s orders to Chosen Soren’s top officials in his cabinet room while the ship is 
docked at Niigata.163   
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D. JAPAN RESPONDS TO THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT  
Japan’s prolonged economic slump shook the public’s confidence and threatened 
stability.  High profile drug seizures of the late 1990s uncovered that the DPRK had 
forged business ties with Japan’s syndicated criminal organizations, or yakuza, creating a 
very dangerous partnership.  On 31 August 1998, North Korea test-fired a Taepodong 
missile over Japanese territory.  The incident not only exposed Japan’s vulnerability to 
such a strike, it caused an alarmed public to examine how North Korea obtained such 
technology.  The Japanese soon realized that many business dealings with North Korea 
were putting their country at risk. 
  Once North Korea demonstrated that it was a credible military threat, Tokyo had 
no choice but to devise a tougher policy toward the DPRK.  Japanese politicians claimed 
that Chosen Soren jeopardized Japan’s security because it helped North Korea obtain 
dual use technology.  "We pay them money and we get Taepodong missiles as a receipt," 
said Japanese lawmaker Koike Yuriko.164 
 Takesada Hideshi, a professor at the National Institute for Defense Studies 
(NIDS) estimated that between 30-50 percent of currency flowing into North Korea went 
to the military.  Takesada claimed that for many years, Chosen Soren bought high-tech 
items in Tokyo’s electronics district, Ikehabara, and exported the dual use technology to 
North Korea.  Examples included titanium golf clubs whose shafts were melted down to 
make missiles, insecticides used in chemical weapons, graphite, computer chips, and 
Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) items.  Consequently, in the spring of 2002, the 
Department of Industry and Economy enacted a “catch all” regulation to eliminate the 
transfer of dual-use technology to North Korea.165   
The political environment in Japan also demanded that Japan’s many economic 
ties with North Korea be closely reexamined, eventually putting an end to even legal 
monetary remittances to the DPRK.  In 1975, Ashikaga Bank in Tochigi Prefecture 
concluded an agreement with the Foreign Trade Bank of (North) Korea to become the 
sole Japanese bank to mediate remittances to the DPRK.  In January 2001, the 
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government of Japan began pressuring the bank to end this practice.  In April 2002, 
Ashikaga Bank canceled the correspondent agreement with the North Korean bank and 
stopped mediating the remittances.166  Upon hearing the news, Kum Ki Do of Chosen 
Soren’s International Affairs Department in Kyoto lamented, “The window we had 
through the Ashikaga Bank is now closed.”167 
E. GENERATIONAL CHANGE 
Despite the clear business connections—legal and illegal— between the Korean 
community in Japan and North Korea, by 1997 these ties were showing signs of strain.  
Disillusionment with the Kim dynasty in North Korea, especially when compared to 
South Korea’s overwhelming success; generational change; and Japan’s own economic 
woes all served to erode Chosen Soren’s monetary and emotional support for the DPRK.   
1. “Japanization” of Ethnic Koreans   
Chosen Soren spokesman So Chung On complained that the flagging support for 
Chosen Soren was the result of the "Japanization" of ethnic Koreans.168  First and second 
generation migrants from Korea were being replaced by offspring who had few ties to the 
motherland.  In 1997, 90 percent of the 680,000 zainichi Koreans were under 60 years 
old.  A Japanese official who monitored the Korean community commented that Koreans 
were “mainly concerned with improving their lot in Japan, which they consider their 
home.”169   
 Since its establishment in 1955, Chosen Soren had promoted Korean unification 
under the Kim dynasty while ignoring Japanese domestic issues, which did not concern 
“the overseas citizens of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea.” Chosen Soren’s 
increasing irrelevance to Koreans who had lived their entire lives in Japan was reflected 
by 1997 estimates that donations to the organization had fallen to 10 or 20 percent of 
their peak in the 1980s.170  
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 By the late 1990s, Chosen Soren schools all across the country were closing for 
lack of students.  Although Korean parents valued the cultural education the schools 
provided, many wanted to avoid political-indoctrination courses as well as ease their 
children’s integration into Japanese society.  This was worrisome for Chosen Soren 
leaders whose power was derived from keeping its members tightly knit by segregating 
them from mainstream Japanese society.171   
2. Improvement of Social Conditions for Koreans in Japan   
Japanese society, while still having room for improvement, has made marked 
progress in legally protecting the civil rights of Koreans and other minorities.  After 
World War II, Koreans in Japan were stripped of their Japanese citizenship and simply 
classified as “permanent foreign residents” by the Japanese government.  Mindan and 
Chosen Soren were formed to enable poor and powerless Koreans to literally survive in 
Japanese society.  Since, becoming a naturalized Japanese citizen was (and still is) very 
difficult, many zainichi Koreans were without any official citizenship until Japan and the 
ROK normalization of relations in 1965.  Those zainichi Koreans who chose to were then 
able to obtain South Korean citizenship and important benefits like embassy services and 
passports.  Those registered as “North Koreans” are still technically stateless, as Japan 
and the DPRK still have not established formal diplomatic relations.   While Chosen 
Soren has focused its energies to promote DPRK interests and undermine Seoul, Mindan 
actively campaigns for social equality for zainichi Koreans.   
Three watershed events significantly enhanced opportunities for zainichi Koreans 
to enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  First, a 1974 judgment against Hitachi 
proscribed discriminatory hiring practices in Japan.172  Beginning in 1985, Japan began 
granting citizenship to newborns based on whether either the mother or the father of the 
child was Japanese.  Previously, the citizenship of the father was the only factor in 
determining the nationality of the child.  This change meant that the increasing numbers 
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of children born to Japanese-Korean couples would be Japanese citizens.  Finally, in 
1993, Japan stopped requiring zainichi Koreans to submit to fingerprinting and carry 
around passbooks.173  Until then, the only other people in Japan required to comply with 
such regulations were convicted criminals, which humiliated and infuriated zainichi 
Koreans.  Additionally, social activists gradually succeeded in getting many essential 
social services extended to permanent foreign residents.  
A strong argument can be made that the many thousands of Koreans who 
identified with North Korea, even though 90 percent of them originally hailed from the 
South, were protesting against their mistreatment in Japan as much as they were 
expressing their political sentiments.  By 1997, Japan was a much more equitable country 
to live in for Koreans, and Chang Yoo Woon decided to confess to being a North Korean 
operative for 18 years.  Chang said his major activates were spying and fundraising, and 
he claimed to have raised $60 million for Pyongyang.  Chang said that his deepest regret 
was that he set out to fight prejudice and injustice against Koreans in Japan but succeeded 
only in sowing more distrust:  “Before the war, Koreans were discriminated against, but 
now we are creating reasons to be despised once again.  Anti-Japanese education [in 
Chosen Soren schools], kidnapping, spying, illegal transfer of money . . ..  There will 
certainly be a backlash.  It is unavoidable.”174 
3. Disillusionment with North Korea  
Shortly after meeting with Jimmy Carter to resolve the 1994 crisis, DPRK leader 
Kim Il Sung died on 8 July 1994.  Known to his countrymen as “The Great Leader,” Kim 
Il Sung had ruled North Korea since its founding on 9 September 1948.  Remittances to 
the DPRK from Japan dropped sharply after Kim Il Sung’s death, reflecting Chosen 
Soren’s displeasure with his son and heir, “The Dear Leader,” Kim Jung Il.175  By 1996, 
American and Japanese economic and intelligence analysis estimated that monetary 
remittances had fallen by more than 80 percent to less than $100 million a year.176   
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Chosen Soren membership, which had already decreased from 224,000 to 
110,000 since 1990, took an even bigger hit when top Pyongyang ideologue Hwang Jang 
Yop defected to South Korea in February 1997, resulting in a surge of defections.  In 
Osaka, the heart of the Korean community in Japan, 183 zainichi Koreans switched 
loyalty from the North to the South, well above the monthly average of 95 per month.  In 
nearby Kobe, another stronghold of pro-Pyongyang Koreans, the average number of 
people leaving Chosen Soren per month rose from 55 in January to 102 in June.  One 
Japanese commentator stated, "the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jung Il dictatorship has become 
a laughing stock” among the Korean community.  Not surprisingly, defections to North 
Korea, in contrast, had petered out long ago.  More than 93,000 Koreans from Japan 
resettled in the North since the Calcutta Agreement’s initial repatriation in 1959, but few 
had done so since 1984.177   
 Chosen Soren businessmen, described by Kansai University economics professor 
Lee Young Hwa as “Kim Jung Il's wallet,” were also bailing out on “The Dear 
Leader.”178  Chosen Soren businessmen had 13 billion yen of investments in the North, 
but most were unprofitable due to red tape and corruption by party leaders.  Furthermore, 
Chosen Soren businessmen were increasingly disillusioned by ceaseless demands for 
"donations" to Kim Jung Il's pet projects.   One of the most prominent defectors was 
Chon Su Yol, whose father was decorated by Kim Il Sung for his generous donations to 
North Korea.  Chon, owner of the Sakura Group restaurant chain, shocked North Korean 
officials when he appeared in Seoul in 1997 to make business deals.179  
 Song Sun Jong, a wealthy businessman who made his fortune running cafes and 
pachinko parlors, also abandoned Chosen Soren in 1997 after a depressing visit to the 
North.  After seeing his relatives living in misery with their every move watched by the 
authorities, Song returned to Japan and launched an anti-Pyongyang organization calling 
for a change of government.  "I supported the North for 50 years because Kim Il Sung 
once said people without a homeland is worse than a stray dog," Song said. "But man is 
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different from an animal: he needs freedom and equality and human rights, and these 
simply don't exist in the North."180   
 In April 1999, Kim Jung Il ordered Chosen Soren to carry out "reform and 
transformation" to forestall the collapse of the organization in the face of the adversity it 
was facing, especially as its membership rolls were rapidly shrinking.  The most notable 
aspect of this change was a move from the first generation’s ideology-driven “stance of 
toeing the Pyongyang line" to an organization focused on mutual assistance and practical 
interests.  This was preferred by the second and third generations “that wished to plant 
their roots in Japanese soil for good.”  The strategy behind this transformation was to 
improve Chosen Soren’s ability to act as a mediator between Japan and the DPRK when 
normalization talks resumed.181      
F. KIDNAPPING         
Clearly, Chosen Soren’s pertinence and popularity among zainichi Koreans was 
decreasing rapidly.  This critical problem was compounded by Japanese apprehension of 
North Korea’s aggressive military development.  In the end, the menace posed by the 
activities of Chosen Soren and its patron government toward the general Japanese 
population resulted in its downfall.  
1. Allegations  
 In May 1997, the Japanese government exploded a bombshell that severely 
wounded Chosen Soren politically when it announced that North Korea was the leading 
suspect in the disappearances of at least nine Japanese citizens over the past two decades.  
Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro told reporters that he was "pretty certain" North 
Korea was involved in the abductions of at least nine Japanese and that "there are very 
strong suspicions" but no conclusive proof that North Korea was also involved in the 
disappearances of more than ten others.182   
 Hashimoto threatened to cut off food aid to North Korea until Japan got answers 
about the alleged abductions.  Sato Katsumi of Modern Korea Research Institute, 
                                                 
180 Shim Jae Hoon, “Disillusioned Donors.”   
181 Hwang Song-ki, “Background of Kim Chong-il’s Order for the ‘Reform of Ch’ongnyon,’” Seoul 
Taehan Maei, 4 August 1999, in FBIS, 22 November 2003. 
182 Efron, “Anger Toward North Korea Intensifies.” 
 55
remarked, "The government is now admitting they knew that six or nine Japanese were 
abducted by North Korea, so now people are demanding to know why on earth they 
didn't do anything about it before. Hashimoto can't possibly back off on the food aid 
issue,” Sato added. "He'd lose the next election.  This is the first time I've seen the 
Japanese people so angry."183 
Five years later, Kim Jung Il himself struck the fatal blow to Chosen Soren during 
his summit with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro.  Koizumi’s attempt to 
normalize relations with North Korea on 17 September 2002 was undone when Kim 
surprisingly admitted to and apologized for the kidnappings of 13 Japanese nationals in 
the 1970s. The abductees had been used to train North Korean spies in Japanese language 
and culture.184   
If the suspected kidnappings made the Japanese angry, the confirmation of those 
allegations resulted in nothing short of rage.  In the two months after the Kim-Koizumi 
summit there were 300 incidents nationwide of verbal and physical abuse toward Chosen 
Soren members, most of whom were students easily identified because they wore 
traditional Korean school uniforms.  Credit unions and schools have also been targets of 
hate mail, harassing telephone calls, and even bomb and bullet attacks, and riot police 
have been stationed outside Chosen Soren headquarters in downtown Tokyo to keep out 
outraged Japanese.185   
2. Fallout 
Anger on the streets translated to very responsive politicians and the quick 
enactment of tough measures against Chosen Soren, and more directly, North Korea.  In 
December 2002, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo asserted that Japan could 
stop remittances of money to North Korea based on UN Security Council Resolution 
1373, meant to combat terrorism by cutting of the sources of terrorists’ funds.  This 
implied that the government would enact Article 16 of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign 
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Trade Control Law, which allows Japan to curb monetary remittances abroad to honor 
international agreements.186  Subsequently, the Hana Credit Union, created in 2002 by 
combining five failed chogins, was put under special surveillance by Japan’s Financial 
Services Agency on 9 January 2003, making shady money transfers practically 
impossible.187  The Japanese government also stepped up its pressure on the DPRK by 
expanding investigations into businesses that export to the North.  Results were evident 
by June 2003 when, according to government official Sawaike Shinobu, "the volume of 
business [between Japan and the DPRK] may have dropped by 20 to 30 percent already 
this year."188   
In April 2003, the Japanese government began strict surveillance of cargo 
transported to North Korea from Japan, specifically tightening up inspections of the Man 
Gyong Bong-92.189  "It is said that important resources such as weapons components are 
exported from Japan. Until now, inspections inside the ship were not strictly conducted," 
Land, Infrastructure and Transport Minister Chikage Ogi admitted at the news conference 
announcing the changes.190  In fact, rancor toward North Korea in Japan was so bad after 
the summit that the Man Gyong Bong-92 suspended services for seven months between 
January and August 2003.191   
Fallout from the summit also cost Chosen Soren its special exemption from 
taxation, given its traditional role as Pyongyang’s de facto governmental agency in 
Tokyo.  During the summer of 2003, local governments all over Japan began 
reconsidering their policies of making Chosen Soren facilities either partially or entirely 
exempt from fixed-asset taxation, citing negative public sentiment toward North Korea as 
well as suspicions that Chosen Soren may have been involved in the illegal export of 
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missile components to the DPRK.192  Tokyo’s right wing demagogue governor (mayor) 
Ishihara Shintaro went as far as seizing three Chosen Soren facilities on the grounds of 
nonpayment of taxes.193 
The actions of Japanese politicians certainly reflected the anger of their 
constituents.  Sometimes what is not done sends an equally powerful message.  The 
annual DPRK Founding Day banquet (September 9) used to attract power brokers from 
the LDP, but this year, not even representatives from the Japan Communist Party dared 
be seen at a North Korean event.  Anger over the DPRK's nuclear weapon and missile 
programs and its kidnapping of Japanese has firmly set Japanese public opinion against 
North Korea and Chosen Soren.194  
3. Implications for Chosen Soren 
The angry Japanese response to the kidnapping admission was meet by equally 
sincere feelings of shock and dismay by pro-Pyongyang Koreans.   The Kim-Koizumi 
Summit shook Chosen Soren to its core.  Kim Myong Su, Vice Bureau Chief of Chosen 
Soren’s International Bureau, admitted that “(Kim’s apology) came out of the blue.”195  
A former member lamented, “I assume Kim Jong Il betrayed us because he might have 
concluded that our community in Japan lost its ability to remit money to him.  I believe 
that Mr. Kim is cutting us out.”196  One observer commented, “Many are leaving the 
organization now.  Most are in a state of shock.  For years, they believed the North’s 
denials, and claimed that anything else was slander and propaganda.  And then Kim Jung 
Il himself admitted that it was true.”197   
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As one might suspect, many in Japan were quick to implicate Chosen Soren in the 
kidnappings, if only guilt by association.  Over the past few years, books by former 
Chosen Soren members and North Korean spies have alleged that Chosen Soren was 
either informed about the abductions by North Korean officials or indirectly assisted 
agents who carried out the operations in Japan by acting as guides or providing other 
logistical support.198   However, according to the PSIA, no verifiable evidence has been 
presented to support any allegations that Chosen Soren members took part in or arranged 
abductions.199 
But many Japanese using deductive reasoning cannot exonerate the organization.  
Professor Takesada believes the kidnappings of Japanese citizens were made possible by 
the cooperation of North Korean agents and a radical group within Chosen Soren known 
as the Gakushu-gumi (“Study Group”).  One of the highest-profile abductions was the 
case of Yokota Megumi, a 13-year old girl who was kidnapped from Niigata. Takesada 
notes that Yokota was kidnapped by people driving a car.  Since a midget submarine is 
not large enough to transport a vehicle, the car must have been provided by Chosen 
Soren.  Thus, Takesada, and many of his contemporaries, have concluded that it was 
“very clear” that Chosen Soren was “deeply involved” in the kidnappings.200 
A long downward trend was evident in the ideology, monetary remissions, and 
membership of Chosen Soren during the 1990s.  Since Kim Jung Il admitted that North 
Korea had kidnapped Japanese citizens as the Japanese had long suspected, the purpose, 
power, and political protection of Chosen Soren have all declined.201  As the following 
chapter illustrates, The Kim-Koizumi Summit was a “watershed” event in Japan-DPRK 
relations.  Tokyo could not ignore the furious outcry of the Japanese public and was 
forced to drastically alter its policy toward Pyongyang.202    
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 This section will briefly review the previous chapters, describe Chosen Soren 
today, and answer the two main questions introduced in “Chapter I:  Introduction.”  It 
concludes with the author’s comments on Chosen Soren and Japan’s North Korea policy.  
The purpose of this thesis was to demonstrate Chosen Soren’s significant impact 
on Japan’s relations with its Korean neighbors over the past 50 years in order to illustrate 
the complexities underlying Japan’s current foreign policy toward the DPRK.   
B. SYNOPSIS 
 The Japan-Korea rivalry emerged centuries ago as both cultures developed under 
the shadow of the great Chinese civilization.  Feelings of antipathy from Japan’s 
colonization of Korea in the first half of the 20th Century continue to adversely affect 
relations today.  The mass movement of Koreans to Japan during the colonial period 
resulted in the formation of Japan’s Korean minority, which has become a permanent, 
living reminder to both nations of their troubled past.  
 Naturally, as the roots of successive generations of Koreans have grown deeper in 
Japan, they identified more with being Japanese, and their ties to Korea have grown 
weaker.  The first generation of Koreans in Japan were polarized by the ideological 
division of their Korean homeland after World War II.   Since Mindan supported what 
many observers consider Japan’s virtual ally, the Republic of Korea, its members 
gradually assimilated into Japanese society.  On the other hand, Chosen Soren staunchly 
supported communist North Korea, an enemy of both the ROK and Japan, and figured 
prominently in the triangular relationship between Japan and the rival governments on the 
Korean peninsula during the Cold War.  Chosen Soren activities and Japan’s reluctance 
to control the organization were a serious strain on Japan-ROK relations, already plagued 
by baggage from the colonial period.  Seoul was also irritated by Japan’s attempted use of 
Chosen Soren to expand economic ties and improve relations with the DPRK.  However, 
as the Cold War progressed, Chosen Soren solidarity began wavering as South Korea’s 
economic and political development far outclassed that of North Korea. 
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 Chosen Soren’s substantial demise over the past ten years is directly attributed to 
both zainichi Korean and Japanese disillusionment with the DPRK.  Pyongyang’s 
increased military threat to Japan and Japan’s decade-long recession prompted many to 
closely scrutinize and eventually restrict Chosen Soren’s economic contributions to North 
Korea.  South Korea’s emergence as an international economic power and democracy, 
Pyongyang’s frequent provocations, and generational change continued to weaken 
Chosen Soren’s membership base.  Finally, the Japanese public’s outrage following 
North Korea’s admission that it had kidnapped Japanese citizens has essentially made it 
impossible for Chosen Soren or anyone else to continue to actively support or show 
leniency toward North Korea.     
C. CHOSEN SOREN TODAY  
The glory days of Chosen Soren are clearly in the past.  Today, only between 
56,000 to 90,000 people out of over 625,000 registered Korean nationals in Japan 
actively support the DPRK.203  The decline of Chosen Soren can be clearly traced to the 
end of the Cold War.  While most other communist regimes have adjusted to the new 
world order, the DPRK has grown increasingly obdurate.  Thus, the hardening of 
Japanese policy toward North Korea has been met with little domestic controversy.204   
Demographic changes no doubt have contributed to the weakening of Chosen 
Soren.  Originally, Chosen Soren was an anti-Japanese organization founded to help 
Koreans get by in Japan until returning to the homeland.  Today’s zaincihi Koreans are 
third or fourth generation, many of whom cannot speak Korean and have no desire to live 
there, and 83 percent of Korean marriages involve intermarriage with a Japanese.205 
The disinterest in promoting Korean culture is exemplified by the fact that there 
are now only 12,000 students in ethnic Korean schools, only a third of the enrollment in 
the 1980s.206  In September 2002, Chosen Soren's leadership decided to remove portraits 
of Kim Jung Il and Kim Il Sung from the 110 elementary and junior high schools which it 
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runs, a move which seemed to be aimed at depoliticizing the organization.207  “We are 
having a tougher and tougher time getting students," U Ze Song, the principal of a pro-
North Korean school, admitted.  "We are emphasizing politics less and emphasizing 
Korean ethnicity and language more."208  
Chosen Soren’s ideological foundation has also crumbled away.  Initially, siding 
with North Korea was a political statement against both the South Korean puppet state 
and Japanese discrimination.  Today, 78 percent of the un-naturalized Korean population 
holds South Korean nationality.209  If people did not question why it was necessary to 
provide financial support to the “worker’s paradise,” doubts about the legitimacy of the 
regime probably began to creep in when they were compelled to send money.   
As decided by the DPRK and organization leaders in 1999, Chosen Soren has 
moved closer to Mindan in order to create an "all-Korean" movement in Japan. Sports 
and cultural exchanges between the two organizations are becoming commonplace.  In 
December 2002, Mindan and Chosen Soren held joint rallies in Tokyo to protest the 
presence of U.S. troops in South Korea.  Times have changed from the days when 
Mindan and Chosen Soren competed to discredit each other in order to solicit sympathy 
and support from the Japanese public.210  However, because of the North Korean 
kidnappings, sympathy is the last thing Chosen Soren can expect from anyone, Korean or 
Japanese. 
D. WHY DID CHOSEN SOREN SURVIVE FOR SO LONG? 
1. Forced Remittances of zainichi Koreans 
 It is clear now that Chosen Soren’s popularity among Koreans is at an all-time 
low and still decreasing.  How was the organization able to remain so vibrant for nearly 
50 years, especially since the ROK and Japan have been so much more successful than 
the DPRK over the last 20 years?  Perhaps the most significant reason was that funds 
were essentially extorted from Chosen Soren members.    
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 Japanese statistics show that 93,340 people moved to the DPRK between 1959 
and 1984.  That number includes 6800 Japanese nationals, of whom 1800 were women 
married to Koreans.211  The Japanese media has detailed numerous complaints from 
zainichi Koreans who were pressured to cooperate with North Korean spies and skim off 
money from loans and other transactions to transfer funds through Chosen Soren officials 
to North Korea.  Some said they feared endangering family members still in North Korea 
if they did not cooperate.212 
  Chosen Soren received support by emphasizing family loyalty.  Chosen Soren 
expert Eric Johnston was also familiar with the DPRK practice of blackmailing zainichi 
Koreans to support relatives in North Korea.  However, Johnston suggested that more 
often, the North Korean community in Japan ostracizing offending parties from the North 
Korean community in Japan.213  Early on, Koreans depended on each other for survival 
because they were discriminated against in Japanese society.   This gave Chosen Soren 
leverage over its members. 
 2. Evolving Social Conditions  
 Tokyo’s calculation that Koreans would eventually be assimilated into Japanese 
society seems to have paid off.  Chosen Soren’s first generation members carried its pre-
war, pro-North Korean sentiments through the Cold War.  The second generation lobbied 
for war compensation, in part to aid relatives in North Korea.  Although this generation 
was pro-North Korea, it eventually became anti-Kim.  Lastly, the third and fourth 
generations do not really care about North Korea because they consider themselves 
adapted as Japanese.214 
 Before the realization of North Korea as a credible threat and public pressure 
forced it into action, the Japanese government may have tried to “ride out” the Chosen 
Soren problem, knowing that time was on its side.  More than 80 percent of Koreans 
marry Japanese; their children are thus automatically Japanese.  The older Korean-
speaking first and second generations have all but passed on.  Because many young 
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ethnic Koreans tend to speak only Japanese and have few links with their ancestral 
country, many see little point in retaining Korean nationality.  Sato Katsumi predicted 
that by 2030 "there won't be any such category as ethnic Koreans in Japan."215  
 3. Political Ties  
 Suspicions about Chosen Soren’s ties with the LDP are similar to Japan’s 
suspicions of the DPRK kidnappings before the September 2002 summit.  Although the 
evidence is out there and rumors swirl, everyone is hesitant about opening this Pandora’s 
box and discovering the definitive truth.   No one questions that Chosen Soren was a 
conduit between North Korea and Japan and that, until recently, it was an “untouchable” 
organization and the beneficiary of quasi-diplomatic political protection from senior 
Japanese politicians.216  There are plausible arguments that the LDP protected Chosen 
Soren to help normalize relations with the DRPK and ensure the stability of the zainichi 
Korean population.  But some would argue that the main reason Chosen Soren was 
because “money from Chosen Soren flowed into the coffers of prominent and influential 
LDP politicians.”217   
Chosen Soren may have also benefited from policy disagreements within the 
Japanese government.  Iwata describes the “open secret” that Chosen Soren was helping 
North Korea.  Japan’s response was soft because normalization with the DPRK was a 
major Japanese foreign policy goal.  Tokyo “didn’t want to paint Chosen Soren into a 
corner” with a policy that would eliminate the possibility of improving relations.218  This 
ceased to be a factor after Kim Jung Il’s kidnapping admission. 
E. IS CHOSEN SOREN A THREAT TO JAPAN? 
 During the summer of 2003, I interviewed several experts in Japan, including U.S. 
State Department officials at the Tokyo Embassy and Osaka Consulate; U.S. Air Force 
Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) and USFJ security personnel at Yokota Air 
Base; professors at the National Defense Academy (NDA) and National Institute for 
Defense Studies (NIDS); the Osaka bureau chief of the Japan Times who has been 
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covering Chosen Soren for over four years; and officials at the Public Security 
Intelligence Agency (PSIA), Japan’s version of the FBI.  In short, everyone I spoke with 
emphatically stated that they did not expect any kind of “fifth column” resistance from 
Chosen Soren in the event of a conflict pitting the United States and Japan against the 
DPRK.   
The money and transfer of dual use technology was a definite security concern, 
but Japan began countering these factors even before it adopted a “hard line” against the 
DPRK in the aftermath of the kidnapping admission.  Economic exchanges between 
Chosen Soren and North Korea are also declining due to the Japanese crackdown and 
generational change.  Japan has successfully tightened the screws on the organization as 
evidenced by its actions against chogins, the Man Byong Gong-92, and taxing Chosen 
Soren real estate.   
The Japanese government thinks Chosen Soren as an entity will not engage in 
terrorist activity but the possibility remains that individuals could act.  In addition, the 
Gakushu-gumi, with an estimated membership of 5000, is often described as a small, 
radical group within Chosen Soren that could commit terrorist acts against USFJ or 
Japanese facilities.  When analysts mention DPRK insurgents in Japan, they are most 
often referring to the Gakushu-gumi.219  Gakushu-gumi has been described as either a 
very secretive group of ideologues or a sleeper terrorist cell that received orders directed 
form Pyongyang.  Other argued that it was mainly a propaganda group that focused on 
winning ROK defectors.  However, given Chosen Soren’s current near bankruptcy and 
dearth of ideological fervor, Gakushu-gumi now appears to be nothing more than an 
“urban legend” leftover from the Cold War.  
 American security experts in Japan have no concrete evidence linking North 
Korean agents to Chosen Soren.  Chosen Soren as an entity is not expected to engage in 
hostilities.  In fact, the Japanese utilize the organization to gather intelligence on other 
subversive groups in Japan.  However, USFJ and the Japanese have to assume that 
sleeper agents, whether sponsored by Chosen Soren or not, would try to upset military 
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operations by delaying the deployment of forces to combat areas should a conflict on the 
peninsula occur.220   
F. JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE DPRK 
 It is clear that Japan’s politicians attempted subtle adjustments to the increasing 
DPRK threat over the last decade.  Because of the first nuclear crisis, Japan and the 
United States took three years to rework their alliance.  After the 1998 missile launch, 
Japan began cooperating with the United States on missile defense and also began 
launching its own satellites.  The initial stages of chogin reform were a part of a larger 
effort to address national banking reform in the midst of the recession more than an 
attempt to cut off monetary support to North Korea. 
In stark contrast, Tokyo’s response to the kidnappings was swift and necessary to 
pacify the incredibly enraged domestic constituency.  After years of allowing Chosen 
Soren to operate nearly unabated, Japanese leaders could no longer turn the other way.     
In less than a year, Japan halted monetary remissions from banks, upgraded its customs 
checks, and eliminated tax breaks for Chosen Soren.   
Since the abduction suspicions became a fact, Diet and right wing hawks have 
seized upon Japanese outrage to stop the flow of Japanese goods, technology, and money 
to North Korea.  Now, Chosen Soren’s semi-diplomatic immunity and its founding 
generations are dying out, it is no longer protected politically, and its relations with both 
North Korea and the Japanese Communist Party are on bad terms.221  Chosen Soren’s 
purpose was to raise money for the DPRK, but now that it can no longer accomplish that 
task, it has no relevant function.  Kim Jung Il urged the organization to transform into a 
social services group in 1999, but it cannot support anyone if it has no members.  Indeed, 
the days of Japan’s “lackadaisical” North Korea policy are over.    
Before the fateful Kim-Koizumi summit there was a break in the U.S.-Japan 
alliance on how to approach North Korea.  Japan preferred dialogue, while the Bush 
                                                 
220 Interview with Special Agent Robert Wood, Director of Operations, 62nd Field Investigation 
Squadron, Air Force Office Of Special Investigations, Yokota Air Base, Japan, 1 July 2003, Yokota Air 
Base. 
221 Interview with Eric Johnston, Osaka Bureau Chief, Japan Times, 24 June 2003. 
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Administration favored pressure.222  Now, the roles are reversed.  Koizumi showed great 
initiative by traveling to Pyongyang, but Japanese anger toward the DPRK has trapped 
Japan into a hard-line policy that must resolve the kidnapping issue before anything else.  
Conversely, the United States is now more willing to negotiate.   
It is also ironic to consider the evolution of ROK policy toward Pyongyang.  
Seoul would never admit it, but it has adopted Japan’s “separation of politics from 
economics” policy in an attempt to build confidence with Kim Jung Il and ensure stability 
on the peninsula.  Some analysts think that the ROK has even replaced Japan as 
Pyongyang’s largest source of uncontrolled cash.223   
Ultimately the kidnapping issue dominates Japan’s thinking about the DPRK and 
reinforces the conclusion regarding the weakened ability of North Korea to utilize 
Chosen Soren to influence Japan’s policies.  Unless it is resolved, Japan and the DPRK 
will not be able to normalize relations and begin the process of healing the many wounds 














   
                                                 
222 Personal interview with Shuichiro Iwata, NDA, 8 July 2003, Yokosuka. 
223 Interview with Brian Barna, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, 3 July 2003. Tokyo. 
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